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INTRODUCTION
For over ten years, academics,1 policy makers,2 and other 
stakeholders3 have debated whether and how governments should 
                                                     
 Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn 
State University, 102 Carnegie Building, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802; 
(814) 863-7996; rmf5@psu.edu; website: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/ 
m/rmf5/. 
1. See, e.g., Ivar A. Hartmann, A Right to Free Internet? On Internet 
Access and Social Rights, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 297 (2013); Lixian Hantover, 
Comment, Creating Sustainable Regulation of the Open Internet, 20 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 107 (2013); Amanda Leese, Note, Net Transparency: Post-Comcast FCC 
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regulate the Internet with an eye toward promoting accessibility, 
affordability, and neutrality.4 This issue has triggered grave concerns 
                                                                                                               
Authority to Enforce Disclosure Requirements Critical to “Preserving the Open 
Internet,” 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81 (2013); Daniel A. Lyons, Net 
Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1029 (2012); Adam Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 
FED. COMM. L.J. 493 (2012); Rob Frieden, Rationales for and Against Regulatory 
Involvement in Resolving Internet Interconnection Disputes, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
266 (2012); Dirk Grunwald, The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for 
Discrimination, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 411 (2011); Rob Frieden, Assessing the Merits 
of Network Neutrality Obligations at Low, Medium and High Network Layers, 115 
PENN ST. L. REV. 49 (2010); Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: 
Understanding Content-Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM.
L.J. 273 (2009); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net 
Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2008, at 1; 
Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and 
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007); Christopher S. Yoo, 
Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A 
Comment on the End-To-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 
(2004); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
2. See, e.g., Statement by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on the FCC’s
Open Internet Rules (Feb. 19, 2014), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/ 
statement-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-fccs-open-internet-rules; see also Grant Gross, 
Bill Would Prohibit FCC from Reclassifying Broadband as Utility, PCWORLD (May 
29, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2303080/bill-would-prohibit-
fcc-from-reclassifying-broadband-as-utility.html. 
3. Free Press, Net Neutrality, SAVE INTERNET, http://www.savetheinternet. 
com/net-neutrality (last visited Apr. 15, 2015); Home, NETCOMPETITION,
http://www.netcompetition.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015); Network Neutrality, 
PUB. KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/net-neutrality (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2015); Protect the Free-Market Internet, AM. COMMITMENT (Feb. 
26, 2015), http://www.americancommitment.org/issues/protect-free-market-internet. 
4. Network neutrality refers to government-mandated nondiscrimination, 
transparency, and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive 
playing field among content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that 
Internet users have unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns such as 
ISP network management and national security. See Preserving the Open Internet,
25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,933 (2010), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part sub 
nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), on remand Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (Jul. 1, 2014). 
For background on network neutrality initiatives outside the United 
States, see, e.g., Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Measures Concerning the European 
Single Market for Electronic Communications and to Achieve a Connected 
Continent, and Amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC, and 
Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Mar. 
20, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+
PV+20140403+ITEM-007-05+DOC+XML+V0//EN; Digital Agenda for Europe: A 
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about the Internet’s ability to continue generating substantial and 
widespread benefits. Advocates for various outcomes have vastly 
different assessments about many baseline subjects, including the 
likelihood that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can self-regulate in 
a robustly competitive marketplace. Consumers become confused by 
different framing of the issues, particularly when participants in the 
Internet ecosystem cannot reach closure on interconnection and 
compensation issues. Increasingly, these disputes result in temporary 
blockage of specific sources and types of content, or general service 
degradation.5
Advocates for government oversight have not produced a large 
and compelling empirical record of long-term harm,6 instead relying 
on forecasts that biased networks will reduce the future value, 
accessibility, and utility of the Internet. Opponents argue that 
regulatory intervention to solve unproven harms imposes costs, 
including uncertainty about the scope of government regulation and a 
net reduction in innovation and investment in Internet infrastructure 
                                                                                                               
Europe 2020 Initiative, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eu-
actions (last updated Feb. 3, 2015); Catherine Jasserand, Critical Views on the 
French Approach to “Net Neutrality,” 16 J. INTERNET L., Mar. 2013, at 18; 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, NETWORK 
NEUTRALITY: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES IN THE EU AND IN THE U.S. 13 (2011), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201108/ 
20110825ATT25266/20110825ATT25266EN.pdf; Toshiya Jitsuzumi, Discussion 
on Network Neutrality: Japan’s Perspective, 3 COMM. & CONVERGENCE REV. 71 
(2011). 
5. In 2008, Sprint and Cogent “de-peered” their networks, causing 
temporary service disruptions between their customers. See Om Malik, Cogent, 
Sprint Disconnect Networks, May Cause Web Slowdown, GIGAOM (Oct. 30, 2008,
10:50 PM), http://gigaom.com/2008/10/30/cogent-sprint-un-peer-may-cause-web-
slowdown. In early 2014, Netflix subscribers complained about degraded network 
performance that significantly affected their viewing experience. See Drew 
Fitzgerald & Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix-Traffic Feud Leads to Video Slowdown,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 9:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304899704579391223249896550; Randell Suba, Netflix-
Verizon Standoff: Only Net Neutrality Can Now Stop Video Slowdown, TECH TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2014, 7:27 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3670/20140223/ 
netflix-verizon-standoff-only-net-neutrality-can-now-stop-video-slowdown.htm.  
6. For a frequently cited example of harmful operation of a biased and 
discriminatory network, see Madison River Communications, LLC & Affiliated Cos.,
20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4296-97 (2005) (describing how a small independent telephone 
company agreed to a $15,000 monetary forfeiture and consent decree agreeing not to 
block Digital Subscriber Link customers’ access to competitor’s Voice over the 
Internet Protocol telephone service). 
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and applications.7 Many advocates resort to hyperbole about real or 
predicted problems, but at either pole, the potential for false positives 
and false negatives appears quite likely.8
The former occurs when government regulatory agencies 
establish rules and regulations on an ex ante basis that incorrectly 
anticipates the need for oversight and marketplace intervention.9
Government oversight based on false conjecture and flawed 
forecasting can trigger unnecessary costs borne by ISPs and likely 
passed onto consumers. False negatives occur when actual harm to 
competition and consumers occurs without detection and remedy by 
the national regulatory authority or by subsequent (ex post)
adjudication. 
This Article will report on current issues in the ongoing 
network neutrality or open Internet debate with an eye toward 
identifying new stress points and opportunities for resolution. The 
Article concludes that developments in the Internet ecosystem will 
trigger more conflicts among ISPs and between ISPs and content 
providers. Increasingly, the Internet has become the primary 
broadband medium for information, communications, and 
entertainment (ICE), including an ever-increasing torrent of bit 
streams traveling from the Internet cloud downstream to individual 
subscribers served by “retail” ISPs that install the first- and last-mile 
connections providing consumers with access to the Internet cloud.10
                                                     
7. Daniel L. Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation,
62 FED. COMM. L.J. 13, 16 (2010) (“Those who advocate FCC involvement should 
recognize that resolution by administrative agency, as a first resort to solving often-
legitimate questions about network behavior, is likely to produce worse public 
policies than nongovernmental forums. Ex ante network neutrality regulation of 
Internet network providers—like cable, wireline telephone, and wireless 
companies—poses risks for the continued development of the Internet that some 
network neutrality advocates minimize unrealistically.”).  
8. See, e.g., Jasper P. Sluijs, Network Neutrality Between False Positives 
and False Negatives: Introducing a European Approach to American Broadband 
Markets, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 77 (2010). 
9. Id. at 103. 
10. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks 
that make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these 
networks and the content available via these networks. “The increasing functionality 
of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift is being led 
by the growth of ‘cloud computing’—the ability to run applications and store data 
on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s 
desktop computer.” William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud 
Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 
(2010) (footnote omitted). 
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Growing reliance on the Internet to deliver bandwidth-intensive 
video content to multiple screens has triggered more disputes on the 
technical way to interconnect networks as well as the financial 
compensation owed. How quickly and equitably parties can resolve 
their disputes will have a profound impact on whether governments 
need to intervene to ensure the existence of robust and sustainable 
competition as well as broadband networks capable of 
accommodating ever-increasing demand. 
I. CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND MARKETS ADD NEW 
CHALLENGES 
The Internet has become an increasingly important medium for 
accessing much of the content previously available via several 
separate media, such as radio, television, newspapers, magazines, 
and the cinema. Converging technologies, such as digital traffic 
transmission, and addressing and routing standards, make it possible 
to use the Internet as a single platform for accessing content 
previously available only via several different media. Converging 
markets have begun to challenge the ability of content providers to 
create sequential and time-limited “windows” of access based on 
consumers’ willingness to pay. For example, much of the video 
content currently transmitted by broadcasters and cable operators 
reaches a single screen, the television set, at a specific time and 
channel. Alternatives to this “appointment television”11 procedure 
have begun to include “on demand” access anywhere and anytime 
using different display formats to computer monitors, smartphone 
screens, and tablets.12 Consumers can “stream” live content, now 
                                                     
11. “Consumers are changing their viewing habits in favor of ‘TV 
Everywhere.’ They no longer make ‘appointments’ to sit down and view content, 
and are no longer limited by TV programming schedules. They want content 
whenever and wherever they are.” John Clancy, Why the Future of TV Is All About 
Personalization, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/08/25/tv-
mobile-personalization/. 
12. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8613 (2012) (Fourteenth 
Report) (“Today, online viewers can watch television shows (including recently 
aired episodes); newly released and older movies; sporting events; and other content, 
including high-quality content produced specifically for online distribution. Online 
video, like the Internet itself, has migrated beyond the computer to a wide variety of 
devices since the last report. Consumers now can access OVD service via 
computers, smartphones, tablets, gaming consoles, smart television sets, Blu-ray 
players, and a host of consumer electronics products.”).
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simulcasted via broadcast and other media. Additionally, they can 
download files containing content previously broadcasted and 
delivered via Multichannel Video Programming Distributors 
(MVPDs),13 such as cable and satellite television, and newly created 
content like the professional and amateur material available from 
YouTube.14
Convergence presents a near-term opportunity for broadcasters, 
MVPDs, telephone companies, and other creators and distributors of 
content to use the Internet as the primary means for reaching 
consumers. This outcome offers the benefits of greater efficiency and 
operating scale in the creation, distribution, and delivery of content. 
However, increasing reliance on the Internet as the primary medium 
for delivering all kinds of ICE content can trigger concentration of 
ownership and control as market shares increase for the few firms 
that dominate the Internet-access market.15 The possibility exists that 
                                                     
13. “As defined by statute, an MVPD is an entity that makes available for 
purchase multiple channels of video programming. Thus, the MVPD group includes 
cable operators, DBS [Direct Broadcast Satellite] operators, and telephone 
companies that offer multiple channels of video programming.” Annual Assessment 
of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 28 
FCC Rcd. 10,496, 10,503 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (Fifteenth Report). 
14. The FCC uses the term Online Video Distributor (OVD) to identify 
Internet-based creators and distributors of video content. Annual Assessment of the 
Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 29 FCC 
Rcd. 1597, 1599 n.8 (2014). 
An ‘OVD’ is any entity that offers video content by means of the Internet 
or other Internet Protocol (IP)-based transmission path provided by a 
person or entity other than the OVD. An OVD does not include an MVPD 
inside its MVPD footprint or an MVPD to the extent it is offering online 
video content as a component of an MVPD subscription to customers 
whose homes are inside its MVPD footprint. 
Id. (citing Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc., 26
FCC Rcd. 4238, 4357 (2011)). “The issue of whether a certain type of OVD also 
qualifies as an MVPD under the Act and our regulations has been raised in pending 
program access complaint proceedings.” Id. (citing Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. 
Discovery Commc’ns, LLC, No. CSR-8605-P (Mar. 24, 2010)). 
15. See, e.g., FCC, MB DOCKET NO. 14-90, DA 14-1129, COMMISSION 
SEEKS COMMENT ON APPLICATIONS OF AT&T INC. AND DIRECTV TO TRANSFER 
CONTROL OF FCC LICENSES AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS (2014), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1129A1.pdf (proposing $65 
billion dollar acquisition of DirecTV by AT&T); FCC, MB DOCKET NO. 14-57, DA
14-986, COMMISSION SEEKS COMMENT ON APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST 
CORPORATION, TIME WARNER CABLE INC., CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., AND 
SPINCO TO ASSIGN AND TRANSFER CONTROL OF FCC LICENSES AND OTHER 
AUTHORIZATIONS (2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
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a small number of conduit operators can acquire substantial market 
power, making it possible to affect the price and supply of Internet-
access conduits.  
A. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Safeguards 
Advocates for ex ante government regulation of Internet access 
consider it essential that safeguards preclude ISPs from engaging in 
expected discriminatory and anticompetitive practices.16 The network 
neutrality debate addresses whether and how ISPs have the incentive 
and ability to provide preferential access to some content sources 
while handicapping others by providing inferior service, demanding 
unaffordable surcharges, or blocking specific types and sources of 
traffic.17
Opponents to such network neutrality oversight warn that any 
degree of government intervention will stifle innovation, investment, 
and freedom of expression.18 As the Internet grows in importance, the 
                                                                                                               
attachmatch/DA-14-986A1.pdf (proposing $45 billion dollar acquisition of Time 
Warner Cable by Comcast). 
16. See, e.g., April Glaser, An Open Internet Is Essential to a Free Internet: 
Why Net Neutrality Should Matter to Everyone, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/open-internet-essential-
free-internet-why-net-neutrality-should-matter-everyone. 
17. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,908-09 (2010) 
(“We noted the near-unanimous view that the Internet’s openness and the 
transparency of its protocols have been critical to its unparalleled success. Citing 
evidence of broadband providers covertly blocking or degrading Internet traffic, and 
concern that broadband providers have the incentive and ability to expand those 
practices in the near future, we sought comment on prophylactic rules designed to 
preserve the Internet’s prevailing norms of openness.” (footnote omitted)), aff’d in 
part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), on remand Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 
37,448 (Jul. 1, 2014). While the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the 
FCC lacked statutory authority to impose public utility, common carrier rules on 
ISPs, the FCC interpreted the court’s decision as holding: 
[T]hat the Commission had adequately justified the adoption of open 
Internet rules by finding that such rules would preserve and facilitate the 
“virtuous circle” of innovation, demand for Internet services, and 
deployment of broadband infrastructure and that, absent such rules, 
broadband providers would have the incentive and ability to inhibit that 
deployment.  
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. at 37,450-51 (citing 
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 644-46). 
18. See, e.g., David Boaz, Net Neutrality—or Destroying Internet 
Innovation and Investment?, CATO LIBERTY (Sept. 2, 2014, 3:28 PM), 
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network neutrality debate raises issues about the nature, composition, 
and features of next-generation networks that will provide broadband 
services to consumers. Network neutrality advocates believe that the 
Internet has become so essential to individual and societal welfare 
that ex ante rules and regulations are essential to keep the medium 
open, nondiscriminatory, and accessible by creators of content and 
services as well as end users.19 Opponents have an almost opposite 
view that government involvement would handicap the ability of the 
Internet to generate societal and individual benefits.20
B. Can the Internet Ecosystem Self-Regulate? 
The network neutrality debate identifies a wide gap in 
assumptions about the competitiveness of the Internet-access 
marketplace as well as the ability of ISPs to self-regulate. As a 
mostly commercial medium, now largely owned and operated by 
private ventures, the Internet operates in a commercial environment 
where operators seek to maximize profits. However, many 
consumers, legislators, and regulatory officials believe that ISPs 
offer an essential service and accordingly have a duty to make their 
private networks affordable as well as accessible in a neutral and 
nondiscriminatory manner.21
                                                                                                               
http://www.cato.org/blog/net-neutrality-or-destroying-internet-innovation-
investment. 
19. Glaser, supra note 16 (“The Internet is how we communicate and how 
we work, learn new things, and find out where to go and how to get there. It keeps 
us connected to those we love and informed of political events that affect our 
everyday lives. . . . We depend on the Internet for everything we do, from our efforts 
to reform broken copyright laws, to our ongoing battles to end the NSA’s illegal 
mass surveillance. More fundamentally, we know that the open Internet makes 
possible not just our activism, but the work of many others around the world. . . .
Good net neutrality rules would forbid Internet providers from discriminating 
against sites that cannot afford to pay a toll for preferential treatment, or sites that 
are critical of Internet providers or undermine their business models.”).
20. ROSLYN LAYTON, COMMENTS OF ROSLYN LAYTON 2 (2014), available at
http://roslynlayton.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Roslyn-Layton-NPRM-14-
28.pdf (“The FCC should not adopt sector specific net neutrality or ‘Open Internet’
rules. It has scant evidence for net neutrality violation; the academic literature about 
net neutrality has ambiguous conclusions about its benefits; and there is a not a 
general agreement of market failure needing fixing with net neutrality rules.”).
21. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Comcast Versus the Open Internet, NEW YORKER
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/comcast-versus-the-
open-internet; see also Susan Crawford, Introducing the Comcast Tax,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 24, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/ 
articles/2014-02-24/introducing-the-comcast-tax. 
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In the Internet’s initial developing years, governments 
supported such openness through direct funding of research and 
development projects that created nondiscriminatory “best efforts”
routing as the Internet’s standard format for switching, routing, and 
delivering traffic.22 Even though governments for the most part have 
privatized their investments and private enterprises predominate, 
many consumers continue to believe that network owners have an 
ongoing obligation to support access much like the duties borne by 
public utilities that provide electricity, gas, water, and sewage 
processing. Going forward, the growing importance of the Internet 
highlights the importance in resolving debates over the Internet’s
future and the role, if any, of governments. 
As the Internet evolves and matures, ISPs have begun to create 
increasingly diversified business models that deviate from offering 
undifferentiated service to everyone. In its early years of operation,23
the Internet operated as a neutral conduit offering nondiscriminatory 
routing of traffic based on technical formats, known as protocols, 
that required “best efforts” traffic routing.24 Additionally, 
                                                     
22. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN.
L. REV. 273, 277-78 (2008) (“The Internet developed initially as an academic 
curiosity, based on a commitment to the ‘end-to-end principle.’ This principle 
requires that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) ‘call’ or a video stream, be treated equally and managed through ‘best 
efforts’ connections. In such a network, data packets pass from one router to another 
without the prioritization of any particular packets. In practice, this means that 
Internet traffic reaches its destination at varying times, depending on the traffic 
levels of the relevant Internet communications links.” (footnote omitted)).  
23. For background on the history of Internet development, see Barry M. 
Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www. 
internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2015); see also William B. Norton, The Evolution of the U.S. 
Internet Peering Ecosystem (Nov. 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://www.apricot.net/apricot2004/doc/cd_content/26th%20February%202004/Asi
a%20Pacific%20Peering%20Conference/01%20-%20Bill%20norton/U.S.%20 
Peering%20Ecosystem%20v1.1.pdf. 
24. Lyons, supra note 1, at 1035 (“The Internet is comprised of a series of 
‘best efforts’ networks, each of which helps deliver any and all digital packets based 
upon the network’s best guess as to how to forward each packet to its final 
destination. A critical element of this network architecture is that best efforts 
networks are indifferent as to the content of each packet. This functionality greatly 
reduces the cost of cyberspace innovation: As long as a service can be converted to 
digital packets, the network will facilitate its delivery to the consumer just like any 
other service in cyberspace. A developer needs only to write a program and place it 
on a public server, and the program is then immediately available to millions of 
Internet users worldwide.” (footnotes omitted)).
748 Michigan State Law Review  2015:739 
governments either owned and operated the Internet’s transmission 
capacity, or provided funding for construction and operation by 
universities.25 The combination of taxpayer funding coupled with use 
of the same technical standards favored the offering of “plain 
vanilla,” “one-size-fits-all” terms and conditions.  
Government grants and subsidies initially foreclosed even the 
need for network operators to consider which users generated the 
most demand for service. With government subsidies, Internet 
operators had no incentive to meter traffic and to charge higher rates 
to heavy users. The lack of concern about who generated costs and 
“first in, first out” processing of packets established 
nondiscrimination as the standard operating procedure. Internet users 
assume that ISPs should continue to operate as neutral conduits, 
despite the fact that transmission formats and commercial incentives 
have changed and so too have consumer requirements. For example, 
consumers have a quick pain threshold for service degradation 
caused by actual network congestion, especially for access to “must 
see” television.26
Government funding and a default technical standard of 
neutrality initially eliminated any incentive for ISPs to favor certain 
types and sources of traffic. As the Internet evolved, governments 
privatized their investments and increasingly relied on the private 
sector to construct new facilities. The combination of a 
commercialized Internet and extraordinary marketplace success has 
motivated ISPs to consider pricing alternatives to unmetered, “all 
you can eat” service offered on an undifferentiated basis.  
Having borne the financial responsibility to expand network 
capacity to accommodate growing demand, ISPs now want to recoup 
and profit from their infrastructure investments. Operating in what 
                                                                                                               
One way to define a minimum level of access is as a requirement that 
broadband providers apply no less than a “best effort” standard to deliver 
traffic to end users. For any particular type of Internet traffic, best-effort 
delivery would represent the “typical” level of service for that type of 
traffic—in effect, routing traffic according to the “traditional” architecture 
of the Internet. 
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448, 37,462 (Jul. 1, 
2014). 
25. See Leiner et al., supra note 23. 
26. See Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of 
“Mission Critical” Bits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 2) (on file with author); see also Rob Frieden, The Impact of Next 
Generation Television on Consumers and the First Amendment, 24 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 80 (2013). 
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some economists refer to as a two-sided market, retail ISPs seek 
higher compensation from both downstream and upstream users of 
their networks.27 Retail ISPs have segmented service into different 
tiers and costs based on transmission delivery speeds and a monthly 
allotment of downloaded and uploaded content. They also demand 
additional compensation from upstream ISPs and content sources 
whose downstream traffic volumes exceed what upstream traffic the 
retail ISP can hand off. 
Additionally, ISPs have considered offering ways to enhance 
the prospects of congestion-free traffic delivery. They characterize 
such “paid prioritization”28 of traffic as lawful and desirable price-
and-quality-of-service discrimination necessitated by the increasing 
torrent of bandwidth-intensive downstream traffic, such as Internet 
Protocol Television (IPTV)29 and other Over-the-Top (OTT)30
                                                     
27. Dennis L. Weisman & Robert B. Kulick, Price Discrimination, Two-
Sided Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 
87-88 (2010) (“Informally, a two-sided market can be thought of as a meeting place 
that brings together two distinct user groups, each of which benefits from the 
presence of the other. Examples include auctions, credit cards, dating bars, 
newspapers, video game consoles, and the Yellow Pages. No car auction would be 
possible without the presence of buyers willing to purchase and sellers willing to sell 
vehicles; thus, auctioneers must set their commissions to make sure there are a 
sufficient numbers of buyers and sellers at a given auction. In the case of 
heterosexual ‘singles’ bars, bar owners must attract both men and women and often 
set different prices for men and women to attract each gender in the desired 
proportions. Newspapers derive their revenues from both subscribers and 
advertisers; thus, the prices that newspapers set for subscribers and the prices they 
set for advertising space must be calibrated due to the fact that advertisers’
willingness to pay will be determined by subscribership.” (footnotes omitted)); see 
also Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125 
(2009). 
28. Tejas N. Narechania, Network Nepotism and the Market for Content 
Delivery, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 29 (2014) (“[A] paid prioritization service 
allows broadband carriers to charge content providers for priority when allocating 
the network’s shared resources, including the potentially scarce bandwidth over the 
last-mile connection between the Internet and an individual broadband subscriber. 
Such allocation has historically been determined by detached—or ‘neutral’—
algorithms. The Commission’s newly proposed rules, however, would allow carriers 
to subject this allocation to a content provider’s ability and willingness to pay.”).
29. IPTV offers consumers with broadband connection options to download 
video files or view (streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. Sky 
Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3879 (2010). Some of the available content 
duplicates what cable television subscribers receive, therein triggering disputes over 
whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an 
IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been 
providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and 
a half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids 
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applications that ride on a broadband connection. For ventures 
offering these kinds of bandwidth-intensive applications, ISPs have 
begun to offer “most favored nation” treatment of such “mission 
critical” packets in exchange for higher compensation.31 Because a 
“best efforts” routing standard might not guarantee sufficiently high 
quality of service in the downloading and immediate viewing of 
“streaming” video content, subscribers now expect ISPs and content 
sources, such as Netflix, to make the necessary arrangements to 
ensure timely delivery of video packets. 
Changes in the technical capabilities of the Internet coupled 
with greater demand for faster and higher capacity bit transmission 
have created new incentives for ISPs to devise ways to offer different 
tiers of service based on the speed and volume of traffic handled.32
Faster delivery speeds or higher monthly capacity allowances do not 
constitute unfair price-and-quality-of-service discrimination, because 
any subscriber can opt for a superior service options at a higher 
charge commensurate with the higher costs incurred by an ISP. 
Similarly, few would object to financial arrangements that reduce the 
time it takes to deliver content, a factor commonly referred to as 
                                                                                                               
Channel, Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these 
channels are a significant part of its service offering.” Id. at 3879-80 (footnote 
omitted). For background on IPTV, see generally In-Sung Yoo, Comment, The 
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal 
Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and 
Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009). 
30. “Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require the end user to obtain 
broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top 
[services] can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities.”
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,916 n.48 (2010), aff’d in 
part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), on remand Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 
37,448 (Jul. 1, 2014). 
31. “Today, much Web content is not delivered to the ultimate recipient 
directly from the Web server belonging to the original creator, but via a content 
delivery network (CDN)—a collection of servers that cache the content and deliver 
it on demand.” David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-To-End 
Argument and Application Design: The Role of Trust, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 357, 364-
65 (2011). 
32. See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that 
Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 84 (2010) 
(outlining new ISP interconnection variations of peering and transiting). 
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latency.33 Companies such as Akamai reduce latency by installing 
proxy servers to distribute content closer to end users.34
However, network neutrality concerns arise when an ISP 
proposes to prioritize traffic delivery, particularly for the last-mile 
link to retail ISP subscribers. Opponents fear that retail ISPs will 
impose “pay to play” surcharges based on their ability to control 
whether and how well traffic reaches end users.35 The possibility 
exists that ISPs will ration access to their networks and deliberately 
slow or delay the delivery of non-premium service traffic. Retail 
ISPs possibly can create artificial congestion while claiming that 
service degradation results from legitimate tactics designed to 
apportion scarce and overtaxed network capacity in response to 
extreme demands for service.36
                                                     
33. Latency refers to the time it takes for upstream or downstream traffic to 
arrive at its intended destination. Some applications, such as computer gaming, 
requires fast response times to service requests and therefore very low latency.  
Communicating with a geosynchronous satellite orbiting the earth at a 
distance of greater than 36,000 km results in a round trip latency of about 
500 [milliseconds (ms)]. The necessary signaling between the set-top box 
and the satellite controller, to request assignment of a communication 
channel, can double this to over 1000 ms, which would precluded [sic] use 
of many latency-sensitive services. In contrast, the maximum average 
latency found in our surveys for terrestrial technologies is less than 70 ms.  
FCC’s Office of Eng’g & Tech. & Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau, A
Report on Consumer Wireline Broadband Performance in the U.S., FCC (footnote 
omitted), http://www.fcc.gov/reports/measuring-broadband-america-2014#Findings 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
34. AKAMAI TECHS., INC., TURBO-CHARGING DYNAMIC WEB SITES WITH 
AKAMAI EDGESUITE 1, 3 (2001), available at http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/course/ 
15-749/READINGS/optional/Akamai_EdgeSuite_Turbocharging_Websites.pdf. 
35. See Lyons, supra note 1, at 1035 (“If broadband providers departed 
from the best efforts principle and instead prioritized certain packets over others on 
the basis of content, they could distort the market for Internet content and
applications. As Professors Lessig and Wu explain, prioritization ‘threaten[s] to 
replace survival-of-the-fittest with survival-of-the-favored.’ Rather than allowing 
competition to shape the market for Internet content, broadband providers could pick 
and choose winners by prioritizing favored competitors. And if broadband providers 
could charge for priority delivery, they would dramatically raise the cost of Internet 
innovation by requiring programmers to pay a toll before their products could reach 
consumers. This could shift power toward well-funded corporate developers and 
away from the garage-programmers whose innovations have made the Internet what 
it is.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Letter from Lawrence Lessig & Tim Wu, to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 6 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at
http://timwu.org/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf)). 
36. “‘The routing of data on the Internet is a zero-sum game. Unless there is 
continual congestion, no website would pay for priority treatment. This means the 
FCC’s proposed rules will actually produce a strong incentive for ISPs to create 
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Network neutrality advocates worry that the option to 
accommodate users’ diversifying traffic requirements will provide 
ISPs the opportunity to favor the traffic of corporate affiliates and 
other ventures that voluntarily or reluctantly agree to pay surcharges 
to abate real or fake congestion.37 Advocates for neutrality argue that 
paid prioritization will make it possible for ISPs to create fast-traffic 
links, available for a premium payment with everyone else relegated 
to slow lanes.38 Worse yet, they worry that ISPs can degrade basic 
service to such an intolerably slow speed that most, if not all, content 
ventures would have to migrate to “premium” service. A start-up 
video venture, with limited funding, could experience congestion 
even for an insignificant volume of traffic that previously got 
delivered without any problem.  
The substantial cost in accommodating subscriber demand for 
fast broadband connections necessitates ISP efforts to diversify 
                                                                                                               
congestion through artificial scarcity.’” Timothy Karr, FCC Proposal for a Payola 
Internet Would End Net Neutrality, FREE PRESS (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.freepress.net/press-release/106177/fcc-proposal-payola-internet-would-
end-net-neutrality. 
37. See Lyons, supra note 1, at 1034 (“By regulating the terms upon which 
content providers use their networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could 
manipulate the flow of information in society. For example, Comcast could 
conceivably block consumer access to websites like www.comcastsucks.org that 
criticize the company. Perhaps more realistically, Comcast could block or degrade 
content and applications like Netflix that compete against its other revenue-
generating services. Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up
Internet access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize in providing 
Internet access alone. Rather, the largest broadband providers are cable and 
telephone companies, which have incentives to prevent customers from using their 
broadband connections in ways that threaten their other revenue streams. For 
example, consumer groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet 
providers that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate 
against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make movies available 
over a broadband connection.” (footnotes omitted)).  
38. Michael Weinberg, How the FCC’s Proposed Fast Lanes Would 
Actually Work, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (May 16, 2014), https://www.publicknowledge. 
org/news-blog/blogs/how-the-fccs-proposed-fast-lanes-would-actually-work (“Once 
there is a split internet, ISPs have the incentive to push every new innovation 
towards the fast lane. Innovation in the fast lane means extra revenue, while 
innovation in the slow lane gets them nothing. Investments that would have gone 
into the entire network before the split will now only go into the fast lane. That 
means that the forces that have traditionally increased speeds for everyone will now 
be reserved for those who can pay extra. All the while, the slow lane just keeps 
getting slower in comparison. After all, a slow slow lane makes the premium fast 
lane an even better value!”).
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service offerings on the basis of subscriber bandwidth requirements 
and other customer-specific demand characteristics. ISPs have 
identified new strategies to differentiate their offerings on the basis 
of price, quality of service, transmission speeds, permissible amount 
of capacity uploaded and downloaded, legitimate network-
management objectives, traffic treatment during congestion, and the 
demand for customer-specified network features. However, 
additional anticompetitive strategies include deliberately blocking 
traffic or dropping packets and rationing access to ample delivery 
facilities with an eye toward extracting surcharges or favoring a 
corporate affiliate. 
Changing market conditions support ISP efforts to customize 
service, but the technical means used to achieve this goal have 
proven controversial. Advocates for restricting price and service 
discrimination contend that absent a network neutrality mandate, 
ISPs will use techniques to discriminate in ways that harm 
competitors and consumers.39 Network neutrality supporters claim 
that ISPs have both the incentive and ability to engage in harmful 
discrimination, typically framed as necessary network management 
or a legitimate response to the specific requirements of a customer. 
The worst-case scenario envisioned by network neutrality advocates 
sees a reduction in innovation, efficiency, consumer benefits, and 
national productivity.40
ISPs vehemently claim that they would never meddle with 
customers’ traffic absent a compelling network management 
justification. However, national regulatory authorities, including the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), have uncovered some 
instances of intentional service degradation and traffic blocking. The 
FCC determined that a rural telephone company had deliberately 
prevented its subscribers from accessing Voice over the Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) telephone services that provide a competitive 
alternative to the telephone company’s Digital Subscriber Link, 
                                                     
39. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Commission 
also convincingly detailed how broadband providers’ position in the market gives 
them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services 
they furnish edge providers. Because all end users generally access the Internet 
through a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a ‘terminating 
monopolist’ with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect to edge providers that 
might seek to reach its end-user subscribers.” (citations omitted)). 
40. See Weinberg, supra note 38. 
754 Michigan State Law Review  2015:739 
broadband service.41 The Commission also sanctioned Comcast for 
meddling with file transfers of subscribers containing content that 
offered a substitute to the company’s pay-per-view movie service.42
1. CDN-Retail ISP Conflicts 
A lesser-known controversy occurred when Level 3, a major 
broadband telecommunications carrier, contracted with Netflix to 
serve as its primary distributor of online video content. Level 3 
agreed to serve as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) thereby 
accepting the technical, operational, and financial responsibility to 
arrange for timely and high-quality delivery of Netflix traffic to the 
company’s subscribers via retail ISPs such as Comcast. By 
definition, CDNs generate substantially more traffic requiring 
downstream delivery than they likely will receive from downstream 
ISPs seeking to offset the volume with upstream traffic. In response 
to the increase in terminating traffic generated by Level 3, Comcast, 
acting in the capacity as a retail ISP providing last mile delivery of 
Netflix traffic, demanded additional compensation. Level 3 objected, 
claiming that Comcast had in effect installed an Internet toll booth 
with an eye toward competitively handicapping Netflix vis-à-vis 
Comcast’s video on demand service that also delivers recent movies 
and other premium television content.43 Comcast asserted that it 
simply had responded to a traffic imbalance that triggered the need 
for modification44 to an existing peering arrangement.45
                                                     
41. Madison River Commc’ns, LLC & Affiliated Cos., 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 
4297 (2005). 
42. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028
(2008), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deeming 
the FCC to have exceeded its statutory authority when responding to a complaint 
and imposing network neutrality rules). 
43. Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast’s 
Actions, MARKET WATCH (Nov. 29, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/level-3-communications-issues-statement-concernings-comcasts-actions-2010-
11-29/reflink=MW_news_stmp. 
44. Joe Waz, 10 Facts About Peering, Comcast and Level 3, COMCAST 
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/10-facts-about-
peering-comcast-and-level-3; Joe Waz, Comcast Comments on Level 3, COMCAST 
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/comcast-comments-
on-level-3.
45. For background on the peering process, see Geoff Huston, Internet 
Peering and Settlements, APNIC, https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/ 
i*orgs/number-misuse/internet-peering-and-settlements (last visited Apr. 15, 2015);
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Under ordinary circumstances, when the volume of traffic 
exchanged between Internet carriers changes and becomes 
unbalanced, the carrier generating more traffic than it receives bears 
the financial obligation to compensate the terminating carrier.46
However, ISPs typically seek to balance out the traffic if possible 
before demanding additional compensation. For ISPs that 
concentrate on the downstream delivery of content, an offsetting 
upstream flow of traffic may not be available to forestall a surcharge. 
However, in the dispute between Level 3 and Comcast, Level 3 
operates a large transcontinental network that could handle more 
upstream traffic from Comcast had Comcast elected to offset the 
Netflix downstream traffic volume with upstream traffic that 
otherwise would travel via Comcast’s long-haul network or other ISP 
networks. Additionally, Comcast generates sizeable broadband 
subscription revenues from end users who have every expectation 
that the company will honor its service commitment regardless of 
whether it can extract supplemental payment from Netflix or its 
CDNs.47
Level 3 sought to frame its dispute with Comcast as one 
involving network neutrality and the ability of downstream ISPs to 
use their distribution-channel monopoly to extract unfair financial 
concessions from content providers. Level 3 insisted that because 
retail ISPs receive ample Internet-access subscription fees from their 
customers, no additional payments should come from content 
providers. Comcast framed the issue narrowly as an interconnection 
matter between an upstream ISP and the ISP providing last-mile 
termination.  
                                                                                                               
see also DrPeering.net: Resources to Make Strategic Peering Decisions, DRPEERING 
INT’L, http://drpeering.net/index.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
46. Daniel L. Brenner & Winston Maxwell, The Network Neutrality and the 
Netflix Dispute: Upcoming Challenges for Content Providers in Europe and the 
United States, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar. 2011, at 3, 5 (“Currently, 
agreements for the exchange of Internet traffic are unregulated and left solely to 
commercial negotiation between Internet backbone providers. Agreements for the 
exchange of traffic between operators are called ‘peering agreements’ and 
depending on the balance of traffic, it may be either free or paid. Other arrangements 
provide that one network will carry traffic without exchanging traffic on that 
network link. This will involve payment, and such service is called ‘transit.’”).
47. “Broadband is an extraordinarily profitable service. Top Wall Street 
analysts John Hodulik of UBS and Craig Moffett of Bernstein both report broadband 
margins of 90% based on official company filings.” Wireline Costs and Caps: A 
Few Facts, FAST NET NEWS, http://fastnetnews.com/dslprime/42-d/4148-costs-and-
caps (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
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This dispute and one involving Netflix and Comcast, discussed 
later in this Article, provide evidence that interconnection disputes 
between carriers have great potential for inconveniencing consumers 
and raising their costs for accessing Internet-mediated content. 
Simply having competitive alternatives does not immediately help 
consumers, because the pain threshold for blocked or degraded 
content begins well before one can find a suitable replacement. Even 
if broadband consumers have alternatives to the currently used ISP, 
embroiled in interconnection and carriage disputes, the migration to 
an alternative carrier would occur after the telecast of “must see”
content, such as a football game, and probably would trigger added 
expense and inconvenience.  
Nations throughout the world have addressed the network 
neutrality debate in different ways. The range of strategies runs the 
gamut from the national legislature imposing strict nondiscrimination 
requirements, e.g., Brazil, Chile, and the Netherlands, to doing 
nothing at all.48 Inside these two poles, some nations use a market 
analysis that would trigger government intervention if ISPs, 
individually or collectively, have acquired too much market power, 
e.g., nations in the European Union and Australia.49 Other nations, 
such as Canada and France, have opted to apply some or all of the 
regulatory safeguards applicable to telecommunications services 
instead of classifying Internet access as nonessential, private 
carriage.50
                                                     
48. See, e.g., Kevin J. O’Brien, Dutch Lawmakers Adopt Net Neutrality 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/technology/ 
23neutral.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. “In Brazil this week, lawmakers approved a 
net neutrality provision that bars telecom companies from charging higher rates for 
access to content that uses more bandwidth.” Mark Scott, U.S. Plan for Internet Fast 
Lanes Contrasts with European Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014, 9:20 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/u-s-plan-for-internet-fast-lanes-contrasts-
with-european-rules/. 
49. See Digital Agenda for Europe: A Europe 2020 Initiative, supra note 4;
see also COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL LAYING DOWN MEASURES 
CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
AND TO ACHIEVE A CONNECTED CONTINENT, AND AMENDING DIRECTIVES 
2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC, AND REGULATIONS (EC) NO 1211/2009 AND 
(EU) NO 531/2012 (2014), available at https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/09/Note-NN-14.11.2014.pdf (proposing less rigorous safeguards). 
50. See Review of the Internet Traffic Management Practices of Internet 
Service Providers, CAN. RADIO-TELEVISION & TELECOMM. COMMISSION (Oct. 21, 
2009), http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-657.htm. 
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2. Recurring Litigation and Uncertainty  
In the United States, the FCC has struggled to find direct or 
indirect statutory authority to impose lawful ex ante network 
neutrality rules. The Commission’s regulatory quandary largely 
results from a decision made in 2005 that ISPs offer largely 
unregulated information services and not telecommunications 
services for which the Commission has clear statutory authority to 
regulate.51 On two separate occasions, a reviewing court largely 
rejected efforts by the FCC to assert jurisdiction to establish rules 
that anticipate, sanction, and remedy anticompetitive and 
discriminatory ISP practices.52 Judicial review has clearly stated that 
the FCC does not have statutory authority to establish rules 
prohibiting discrimination and content blocking by ISPs in light of 
the Commission’s lack of authority to impose common-carrier duties 
on ISPs.53 Having determined that broadband Internet access 
constitutes an information service,54 the FCC effectively abandoned 
the option of establishing ex ante regulations, because it no longer 
had the jurisdiction to do so. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals first held that the FCC could 
not sanction Comcast for using software to disable peer-to-peer file 
sharing by subscribers even though the company did not need to 
remedy congestion and had financial incentives to prevent 
subscribers from sharing movies it might otherwise lease from 
Comcast on a pay-per-view basis.55 The court determined that the 
                                                     
51. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853 (2005); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03 (2005) (deferring to FCC expertise 
and affirming its classification of broadband Internet access an information service). 
52. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast 
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
53. See Rob Frieden, The Rise of Quasi-Common Carriers and Conduit 
Convergence, 9 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 471, 473 (2014). 
54. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 977-78; Time Warner 
Telecom, Inc., 507 F.3d at 217; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband 
Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901 (2007); 
United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the 
Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Serv. as an Info. Serv.,
21 FCC Rcd. 13,281, 13,281 (2006); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access 
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,863 (2005); Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4821 (2002). 
55. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 656-60.
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FCC had no direct statutory authority to impose network neutrality 
obligations on information service providers nor could the 
Commission assert “ancillary jurisdiction”56 based on its duty to 
ensure that new technologies do not adversely impact regulated 
services.  
In its review of the FCC’s second attempt to establish 
jurisdiction over ISPs, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals again 
rejected common carrier rules requiring nondiscrimination and 
prohibiting traffic blocking.57 However, the court did agree with the 
                                                     
56. The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the 
Commission lacks explicit statutory authority. The FCC successfully invoked 
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate cable television even before the Commission 
received a statutory mandate to do so.  
The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over cable. To reach that 
goal, it used a two-step process. First, the Commission found that cable was within 
its primary statutory grant of authority under § 152(a) of the [Communications] Act, 
which allows the FCC to regulate “all interstate and foreign communication by wire 
or radio.” Second, the FCC invoked § 303(r) of the Act, which allows the 
Commission to issue “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and 
conditions, not inconsistent with law,” as “public convenience, interest, or necessity 
requires.” The FCC also referenced § 154(i), which provides that “[t]he Commission
may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such 
orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be necessary in the 
execution of its functions.” Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 
572 (2010) (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). See 
generally John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of 
the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 585 (2009); Andrew Gioia, 
FCC Jurisdiction over ISPs in Protocol-Specific Bandwidth Throttling, 15 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 517 (2009); James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of 
the Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2010).
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has affirmed the FCC’s claim 
of ancillary jurisdiction. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 670 
(1972); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 180-81 (1968); see also
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The 
Supreme Court supports deferral to the expertise of a regulating agency “[i]f the 
intent of Congress is clear.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If “Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue,” and the agency has acted pursuant to an 
express or implied delegation of authority, the agency’s statutory interpretation is 
entitled to deference, as long as it is reasonable. Id. at 843-44; see also United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).  
57. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628 (“[E]ven though the Commission has general 
authority to regulate in this arena, it may not impose requirements that contravene 
express statutory mandates. Given that the Commission has chosen to classify 
broadband providers in a manner that exempts them from treatment as common 
carriers, the Communications Act expressly prohibits the Commission from 
nonetheless regulating them as such. Because the Commission has failed to establish 
that the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules do not impose per se common 
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FCC that it could impose non-common carrier rules based on the 
FCC’s reading of § 706 in the Communications Act, which 
authorizes the Commission to assess the availability of nationwide 
access to advanced services such as the Internet and to take steps to 
promote more access if market forces prove inadequate.58
In March 2015, the FCC substantially changed its regulatory 
approach to network neutrality. Rather than act on a reviewing 
court’s invitation to impose non-common carrier, network neutrality 
rules, the Democratic majority of the FCC opted for clearer and more 
muscular ex ante rules on remand.59 The FCC opted to reclassify 
elements of Internet access as a Title-II regulated, common carrier 
service60 with no distinction between wireline and wireless ISPs.61
The Commission will have to convince a reviewing court that the 
decision to reclassify broadband service as common carriage resulted 
from rational decision making based on a complete record 
evidencing substantially changed circumstances occurring in the ten 
years running from 2005, when the FCC opted to classify Internet 
access as an information service.62
                                                                                                               
carrier obligations, we vacate those portions of the Open Internet Order.” (emphasis 
omitted)).  
58. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012).
59. See generally Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 
1120110, ¶¶ 14-24, at *5-7 (2015).  
60. Id. ¶ 25, at *8. 
61. Id. The FCC previously had imposed less stringent rules on wireless 
carriers in light of spectrum use, greater potential for congestion, and recent entry in 
broadband markets. The 2015 Open Internet Order treats wireless ISPs no 
differently than wireline ISPs: “Today, we find that changes in the mobile 
broadband marketplace warrant a revised approach. We find that the mobile 
broadband marketplace has evolved, and continues to evolve, but is no longer in a 
nascent stage. As discussed below, mobile broadband networks are faster, more 
broadly deployed, more widely used, and more technologically advanced than they 
were in 2010. We conclude that it would benefit the millions of consumers who 
access the Internet on mobile devices to apply the same set of Internet openness 
protections to both fixed and mobile networks.” Id. ¶ 88, at *24.  
62. “It is also well settled that we may reconsider, on reasonable grounds, 
the Commission’s earlier application of the ambiguous statutory definitions of 
‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service.’” Id. ¶ 334, at *93.  
The [Supreme] Court’s application of th[e] Chevron test in Brand X makes 
clear our delegated authority to revisit our prior interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory terms and reclassify broadband Internet access 
service as a telecommunications service. The Court upheld the 
Commission’s prior information services classification because “the 
statute fails unambiguously to classify the telecommunications component 
of cable modem service as a distinct offering. This leaves federal 
telecommunications policy in this technical and complex area to be set by 
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The FCC emphasized the need for narrowly crafted rules 
designed to “prevent specific practices we know are harmful to 
Internet openness—blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization—as 
well as a strong standard of conduct designed to prevent the 
deployment of new [anticompetitive] practices that would harm 
Internet openness.”63 The Commission emphasized that ISPs have 
both the incentive and ability to leverage access in ways that can 
thwart the virtuous cycle of innovation and investment in the Internet 
ecosystem: 
The key insight of the virtuous cycle is that broadband providers have both 
the incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between edge 
providers and consumers. As gatekeepers, they can block access 
altogether; they can target competitors, including competitors to their own 
video services; and they can extract unfair tolls.64  
The FCC emphasized that while subjecting ISPs to Title-II, 
common-carrier oversight, the Commission will quite narrowly use 
its statutory authority as evidenced by the decision to forbear65 from 
applying “27 provisions of Title II of the Communications Act, and 
                                                                                                               
the Commission . . . .” Where a term in the Act “admit[s] of two or more 
reasonable ordinary usages, the Commission’s choice of one of them is 
entitled to deference.” The Court concluded, given the “technical, 
complex, and dynamic” questions that the Commission resolved in the 
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, “[t]he Commission is in a far better 
position to address these questions than we are.”
Id. ¶ 332, at 92 (citations omitted). 
63. Id. ¶ 4, at *3. 
64. Id. ¶ 20, at *7. 
65. 47 U.S.C § 160(a) (1996). This statute authorizes the FCC to streamline 
the scope of its Title II oversight by forbearing from applying many common carrier 
requirements:  
[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any 
provision of this chapter to a telecommunications carrier or 
telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or 
telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geographic 
markets, if the Commission determines that—(1) enforcement of such 
regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, 
practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that 
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and 
reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) 
enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the 
protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such 
provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest. 
Id. 
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over 700 Commission rules and regulations.”66 The Commission 
recognized the need to explain how the new requirements satisfy 
pressing needs, but in the most narrow and well calibrated matter in 
light of virulent opposition from most ISPs and the two Republican 
Commissioners. The Order reports that “there will be fewer sections 
of Title II applied than have been applied to Commercial Mobile 
Radio Service (CMRS)[ the regulatory classification for wireless 
voice telecommunications service], where Congress expressly 
required the application of Sections 201, 202, and 208, and permitted 
the Commission to forbear from others. In fact, Title II has never 
been applied in such a focused way.”67
In addition to the specific prohibitions on blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization, the FCC established a general prohibition on 
ISP practices that would unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage 
downstream consumers and upstream edge providers of content, 
applications, and services.68 The Commission will consider on a 
case-by-case basis whether an ISP has engaged in a practice “that 
unreasonably interfere[s] with or unreasonably disadvantage[s] the 
ability of consumers to reach the Internet content, services, and 
applications of their choosing or of edge providers to access 
consumers using the Internet.”69 The Commission opted to apply a
more flexible evaluation rather than use a single commercial 
reasonableness standard that it had proposed in the 2014 Open 
Internet NPRM. The Commission concluded that it should “adopt a 
governing standard that looks to whether consumers or edge 
providers face unreasonable interference or unreasonable 
disadvantages, and makes clear that the standard is not limited to 
whether a practice is agreeable to commercial parties.”70
                                                     
66. 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 5, at *3. The major provisions of Title II that the 
Order will apply are: nondiscrimination and no unjust and unreasonable practices 
under §§ 201 and 202, id. ¶¶ 195, 289, at *56, *80; authority to investigate 
complaints and resolve disputes under § 208 and related enforcement provisions, 
specifically §§ 206, 207, 209, 216 and 217, id. ¶¶ 193, at *55; protection of 
consumer privacy under § 222, id. ¶ 53, at *14; fair access to poles and conduits 
under § 224, id. ¶ 56, at *15; protection of people with disabilities under §§ 225 and 
255, id. ¶ 55, at *15; and providing universal funding for broadband service, but not 
the requirement to collect contributions to such funding through partial application 
of § 254, id. ¶ 57, at *15. 
67. Id. ¶ 38, at *10. 
68. Id. ¶ 108, at *30. 
69. Id. ¶ 135, at *37. 
70. Id. ¶ 150, at *41. The FCC identified a number of factors it will 
consider in future evaluations. Id. ¶¶ 139-45, at *39-40. These include an assessment 
whether a practice allows end-user control and is consistent with promoting 
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The FCC reported that it will use the “no-unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage” standard to evaluate controversial 
subjects including the lawfulness of “sponsored data” arrangements 
where an ISP accepts advertiser payment in exchange for an 
agreement not to meter and debit the downstream traffic delivery.71
The Commission also will use this standard to consider the 
lawfulness of data caps that tier service by the amount of permissible 
downloading volume.72 In both instances, the FCC sees the potential 
for an ISP to create artificial scarcity to extract higher revenues, to 
favor corporate affiliates and third parties willing to pay a surcharge 
as well as the potential for disadvantaging competitors, e.g., using 
data caps to harm new vendors of video programming that compete 
with an ISP service.73 On the other hand, the Commission recognizes 
that service tiering can promote innovation and new, customized 
services.74
The Order expresses the view that reclassifying Internet access 
as a telecommunications service provides the strongest legal 
foundation for the Open Internet regulations, coupled with a 
secondary reference to § 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
and Title III, which addresses the use of radio spectrum and applies 
common carriage regulation to wireless voice carriers.75 By using the 
stronger Title II foundation, the FCC asserts that it can establish 
                                                                                                               
consumer choice; whether a practice has anti-competitive effects; whether 
consumers and opportunities for free expression are promoted or harmed; whether 
there is an the effect on innovation, investment, or broadband deployment; whether 
the practice hiders the ability of end users or edge providers to use broadband access 
to communicate with each other; and whether a practice conforms to best practices 
and technical standards adopted by open, broadly representative, and independent 
Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or standards-setting organization. Id.
71. Id. ¶ 152, at *42. 
72. Id. ¶ 153, at *42. 
73. Id. ¶¶ 151-53, at *42. 
74. Id.
75. Id. ¶¶ 273-74, at *76.  
We ground the open Internet rules we adopt today in multiple sources of 
legal authority—section 706, Title II, and Title III of the Communications 
Act. We marshal all of these sources of authority toward a common 
statutorily-supported goal: to protect and promote Internet openness as 
platform for competition, free expression and innovation; a driver of 
economic growth; and an engine of the virtuous cycle of broadband 
deployment.  
We therefore invoke multiple, complementary sources of legal authority. 
As a number of parties point out, our authority under section 706 is not 
mutually exclusive with our authority under Titles II and III of the Act. 
Id.
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clear and unconditional statutory authority, but also use the 
flexibility contained in Title II to forbear from applying most 
common carrier requirements not relevant to modern broadband 
service just as occurs for wireless telephone service.76 However, with 
a Title II regulatory foundation, the Order makes it possible for the 
FCC to create an open Internet conduct standard that ISPs cannot 
harm consumers or edge providers with enforcement tools available 
to sanction violations.77
The Commission’s decision to treat aspects of Internet access 
as common carriage certainly will trigger a third judicial appeal and 
review whether such reclassification constitutes a reasonable 
decision based on a complete evidentiary record. By opting for the 
reclassification option, the FCC underscores the riskiness in 
imposing ex ante regulation without an explicit legislative mandate. 
The FCC’s approach requires great finesse. On one hand, it 
cannot impose clear common-carrier duties on ISPs, unless it can 
convince an appellate court of the rationality in the reclassification 
from information service to telecommunications service. On the 
other hand, the Commission wants to create ex ante rules that can 
foreclose anticompetitive practices while allowing ISPs to engage in 
commercial negotiations, possibly providing alternatives to plain 
vanilla, best-efforts management of Internet traffic. The FCC 
proposes ad hoc review of complaints about specialized traffic-
management arrangements that arguably provide “better than best 
efforts” routing options for single ventures. However, the 
Commission does not want this option to result in a balkanized 
Internet having fast lanes available to ventures with deep pockets and 
slow lanes available to ventures, including most startups, lacking the 
financial resources to pay surcharges.  
                                                     
76. See generally id.
77. With an eye toward providing timely, certain, and flexible enforcement 
of its open Internet rules, the FCC announced its intention to use advisory opinions 
similar to those issued by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. Id. ¶ 229, 
at *66.  
Advisory opinions will enable companies to seek guidance on the 
propriety of certain open Internet practices before implementing them, 
enabling them to be proactive about compliance and avoid enforcement 
actions later. The Commission may use advisory opinions to explain how 
it will evaluate certain types of behavior and the factors that will be 
considered in determining whether open Internet violations have occurred. 
Because these opinions will be publicly available, we believe that they 
will reduce the number of disputes by providing guidance to the industry.  
Id.
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II. CURRENT STRESS POINTS AND DISPUTES
Consumers have embraced the Internet in part because it offers 
faster, better, smarter, cheaper, and more convenient solutions to 
many ICE wants, needs, and desires. ISPs regularly enhance the 
value proposition of an Internet-access broadband subscription with 
network upgrades, offering faster transmission speeds and 
improvements in the switching and routing of bandwidth-intensive 
traffic, such as IPTV. As the Internet ecosystem lavishly rewards 
content and application providers, ISPs appear to have grown 
increasingly disgruntled with their operating margins and profits 
relative to the far greater returns accruing to content providers, such 
as Google and Netflix. From the ISPs’ perspective, ventures such as 
Amazon, eBay, Hulu, and YouTube could not make their business 
plans work without access to and from ISPs networks. While unable 
to partner with such ventures, with an eye toward sharing profits, 
ISPs appear to have undertaken a second-best strategy of increasing
their compensation demands for interconnecting with both 
downstream retail subscribers and upstream users of their networks 
such as content providers and CDNs.  
Retail ISPs in particular have superior leverage in their 
interconnection and compensation negotiations with other carriers 
and in their retail-service pricing decisions. The first- and last-mile 
broadband connection to end users continues to evidence less than 
robust competition.78 End users have a limited number of ISP service 
options for content uploading and downloading. Typically, the 
incumbent telephone company provides a DSL and possibly a faster 
fiber or hybrid fiber/copper option;79 the cable television company 
                                                     
78. Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks: “The Facts and 
Future of Broadband Competition” 4 (Sept. 4, 2014), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329161A1.pdf (“At the low end 
of throughput, 4 Mbps and 10 Mbps, the majority of Americans have a choice of 
only two providers. That is what economists call a ‘duopoly’, a marketplace that is 
typically characterized by less than vibrant competition. But even two ‘competitors’
overstates the case. Counting the number of choices the consumer has on the day 
before their Internet service is installed does not measure their competitive 
alternatives the day after. Once consumers choose a broadband provider, they face 
high switching costs that include early-termination fees, and equipment rental fees. 
And, if those disincentives to competition weren’t enough, the media is full of 
stories of consumers’ struggles to get ISPs to allow them to drop service.”); see also
National Broadband Map: How Connected Is My Community?, NAT’L BROADBAND 
MAP, http://www.broadbandmap.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
79. See, e.g., High Speed Internet, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/ 
home/highspeedinternet/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  
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provides a faster and more expensive broadband alternative;80 and 
one or two satellite carriers provide a comparatively more expensive 
and slower speed delivery option possibly most attractive to rural 
users lacking other choices.81 Terrestrial wireless carriers have begun 
to offer a competitive option, albeit one typically already imposing 
content downloading caps that raise the per-megabyte cost of service 
well above wireline options. Additionally, questions exist about their 
ability to maintain advertised broadband speeds during peak demand 
conditions.82
Most retail consumers select one and only one carrier to handle 
all of their Internet traffic requirements.83 Should a service disruption 
occur upstream, almost all ISPs can activate or procure alternative 
interconnection arrangements quickly. But at the retail sector, even 
consumers with competitive options will encounter some delay and 
expense in migrating from one carrier to another. 
In light of the possibly limited competitive options available 
for retail Internet-access subscribers and their sole reliance on one 
carrier, the chosen ISP has significant negotiating power with both 
end users and upstream ISPs. End users may balk at the 
                                                     
80. See, e.g., High-Speed Internet Service with XFINITY® Internet from 
Comcast, COMCAST, http://www.comcast.com/internet-service.html (last visited Apr. 
15, 2015).
81. See, e.g., Deals and Pricing, WILDBLUE, http://www.wildblue.com/ 
options/availability (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
82. Hibah Hussain et al., Capping the Nation’s Broadband Future? 
Dwindling Competition Is Fueling the Rise of Increasingly Costly and Restrictive 
Internet Usage Caps, NEW AM. FOUND. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://newamerica.net/ 
publications/policy/capping_the_nation_s_broadband_future.  
[D]ata usage is highly skewed: a small group of very intensive data users 
tie up the network and degrade service for moderate users, who paid the 
same price. The arrival of high-quality mobile video turbo-charges this: 
one high-def TV show is most of a gigabyte, while smartphone users who 
are voice and text-oriented (like me) are unlikely to consume more than 2-
3 GB/month. 
Todd Hixon, Verizon Makes Wireless Pricing Rational, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2012,
8:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2012/08/28/verizon-makes-
wireless-pricing-rational/. 
83. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Commission 
also convincingly detailed how broadband providers’ position in the market gives 
them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services 
they furnish edge providers. Because all end users generally access the Internet 
through a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a ‘terminating 
monopolist’ with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper with respect to edge providers that 
might seek to reach its end-user subscribers.” (citations omitted)).  
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inconvenience of changing carriers,84 and upstream ISPs will have no 
migration option at all if they want to secure access to all end users. 
Put another way, if a single ISP enjoys a dominant market share of 
the retail market, which occurs in many localities, a substantial 
portion of the market exclusively relies on that single ISP making it 
absolutely necessary for upstream ISPs to secure an agreement with 
that ISP for its delivery of content. A single ISP has the potential to 
exert substantial control over access to a majority of the end-user 
market in many places.85 Content providers and distributors are 
captive to that ISP in the sense that they must secure delivery to the 
televisions, computer monitors, smartphones, and tablets that access 
the Internet solely via a single ISP.86 
A. Internet Protocol Television and OTT Applications Trigger Vast 
Increases in Downstream Traffic 
As smartphones and tablets replace less versatile wireless 
handsets, consumers increasingly will use these devices for accessing 
broadband IPTV and OTT services. Netflix currently generates as 
much as 34% of the total traffic ISPs handle at peak hours, making 
IPTV one of the primary causes for increasing bandwidth demand 
and consumers’ interest in securing a broadband subscription.87 The 
expansion in downstream traffic has triggered a number of 
adjustments and ISP demands for additional compensation.  
In light of growing demand for bandwidth-intensive, video 
content delivered via the Internet, traffic-volume disparities have 
increased between ISPs, particularly between ISPs providing “retail”
broadband service to end users and other upstream ISPs such as 
CDNs. As demand for IPTV services increases, Internet traffic flows 
                                                     
84. “[M]any end users may have no option to switch, or at least face very 
limited options . . . .” Id. at 647. 
85. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,924-25
(2010), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623, 
on remand Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (Jul. 1, 
2014); see also Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646. 
86. For a summary of major peering disputes, see Jon Brodkin, Why 
YouTube Buffers: The Secret Deals That Make—and Break—Online Video, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jul. 28, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/07/why-youtube-buffers-the-secret-deals-that-make-and-break-
online-video/. 
87. Drew Fitzgerald, Netflix’s Share of Internet Traffic Grows, WALL ST. J.
(May 14, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023049 
08304579561802483718502.
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will become even more asymmetrical, necessitating new or 
additional payments from ISPs and CDNs with growing downstream 
volume and retail ISPs delivering the traffic to end users. Instead of 
applying a zero-payment barter model, retail ISPs demand and 
receive financial compensation. Content distributors, such as Netflix, 
also consider alternatives to using CDNs, by securing a paid-peering 
arrangement directly with one or more national ISPs88 or installing 
servers containing the most popular content closer to subscribers.89
CDNs typically become transit payers even if previously they 
qualified for zero-cost peering, but questions remain whether retail 
ISPs, such as Comcast, have an affirmative duty to try offsetting 
traffic imbalances. Likewise, consumers wonder what service 
commitments they deserve to receive from their retail ISPs, which 
accrue sizeable monthly Internet-access subscription revenues. The 
carriers respond that they have had to increase available network 
capacity and thereby enhance the value proposition of service despite 
not receiving additional compensation from the ventures, causing 
massive increases in download volume, i.e., ventures such as Netflix 
and YouTube.  
On occasion, retail broadband subscribers have experienced 
degraded service, particularly for bandwidth-intensive applications 
such as full-motion video streaming.90 Identifying the actual cause of 
such congestion remains elusive. Content creators and distributors 
speculate whether retail ISPs have deliberately caused congestion, by 
refusing to make timely network capacity upgrades or by allocating 
available capacity in ways that increase the probability of congestion 
for the traffic of specific content types and sources. ISPs reject this 
scenario and cite to less nefarious circumstances such as weather, 
home-based holidays, and the decision of content distributors, such 
as Netflix, to release an entire season’s worth of a program instead of 
                                                     
88. Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay Comcast for Smoother Streaming,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142 
4052702304834704579401071892041790. 
89. Content providers and distributors can opt to negotiate directly with 
retail ISPs for the right to install (“co-locate”) equipment on site or alternatively 
secure the services of a company, such as Akamai, to negotiate, install, and maintain 
the equipment. Netflix has sought the direct negotiation option with ISPs. Ken 
Florance, Announcing the Netflix Open Connect Network, NETFLIX US & CAN. BLOG
(June 4, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://blog.netflix.com/2012/06/announcing-netflix-open-
connect-network.html.  
90. Fitzgerald & Ramachandran, supra note 5.
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the conventional weekly release of just one episode.91 Consumers and 
regulators alike have no means for identifying the trigger, because 
multiple carriers participate in the complete routing of traffic from 
source to end user. Sophisticated network tracking techniques are 
needed to identify the network operating the weakest link with the 
lowest available bandwidth and switching capacity that can cause 
end users to experience delays in downloads and even dropped 
packets of content.  
B. Increasing Content and Delivery Costs Result in More 
Interconnection and Compensation Disputes and Creative 
Solutions 
In lieu of, or in addition to, the use of CDNs, content sources 
can opt for a direct routing option where they secure a peering 
arrangement for a price. Such paid peering92 provides “most favored 
nation” treatment of specific traffic streams by routing it via 
dedicated transmission capacity for most, if not all, of the complete 
routing. This arrangement provides higher quality of service by 
reducing—if not eliminating—the use of other networks, thereby 
expediting delivery of traffic even when congestion would degrade 
traffic over lines subject to traditional “best efforts” routing.93 Under 
                                                     
91. “The hit political drama series of Netflix kept about 60,000 subscribers 
glued onto their screens on Valentine’s Day to watch the whole 13-hour production. 
However, the shifting behavior of consumers to watch videos on demand over the 
Internet is causing some clogged pipes on the information highway.” Suba, supra 
note 5.
92. Yoo, supra note 32, at 95-96 (“Paid peering involves all of the same 
aspects as conventional peering relationships. Peers announce to the rest of the 
Internet the addresses that their peering partners control, maintain a sufficient 
number of interconnection points across the country, and maintain the requisite total 
volume and traffic ratios. The key difference is that one peering partner pays the 
other partner for its services.”).  
93. Alexander Reicher, Note, Redefining Net Neutrality After Comcast v. 
FCC, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 752 (2011) (“Paid peering, for example, 
resembles normal peering in almost every respect, except that one network pays the 
other network even when the exchange of traffic is roughly the same. These more 
sophisticated agreements reflect the fact that while the traffic exchange may be 
equal, the cost of maintaining the networks’ respective infrastructures may be 
unequal. ISPs serving a smaller number of large internet content websites (known as 
‘content networks’) have lower costs in maintaining their infrastructure than ISPs 
serving home users (‘eyeball networks’), since residential neighborhoods require 
more equipment investment (such as wiring) and maintenance than commercial 
areas. These interconnection agreements create the economic incentives for ISPs to 
route internet traffic along the lowest-cost paths, which can sometimes have a 
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a paid-peering arrangement, traffic can arrive via the most 
advantageous means, resulting in less latency, less circuitous routing 
arrangements, and the use of fewer routers and other switching 
equipment. 
Companies, such as Netflix, have opted to pay for peering 
rather than risk the consequences of degraded network delivery of 
“mission critical,” bandwidth-intensive video.94 The decision by 
Netflix to secure paid-peering access to the Comcast network 
triggered extensive commentary and analysis.95 Some believe Netflix 
capitulated to extortion by succumbing to thinly veiled threats by 
retail ISPs like Comcast that, absent surcharge payments, Netflix 
video file downloads would regularly trigger congestion and a 
degraded customer experience.96 These observers believe Comcast 
caused Netflix traffic to slow down as a way to extort a surcharge 
payment97 from high-volume sources of content to help underwrite 
needed network upgrades.98 Others consider paid peering a pragmatic 
and commercially wise decision by Netflix to secure enhanced 
quality-of-service delivery guarantees to achieve greater certainty 
                                                                                                               
discriminatory effect on certain types of content, applications, and services.”
(emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)).  
94. See Comcast and Netflix Team Up to Provide Customers Excellent User 
Experience, NETFLIX MEDIA CENTER (Feb. 23, 2014), https://pr.netflix.com/ 
WebClient/getNewsSummary.do?newsId=992. 
95. For a collection of commentaries and critiques, see Headlines 
Newsletter, BENTON FOUND., http://benton.org/headlines/newsletter (last visited Apr. 
15, 2015).
96. Joan Engebretson, Verizon, Netflix Dispute Not Just over Peering; 
Servers Are New Battlefield, TELECOMPETITOR (June 20, 2013, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.telecompetitor.com/verizon-netflix-dispute-not-just-over-peering-
servers-are-new-battlefield/ (“High-profile flare-ups between content providers and 
broadband providers over traffic exchange are becoming an annual or even semi-
annual Internet tradition. The latest flare-up is between Cogent Communications, 
which provides backbone connectivity for Netflix, and Verizon. But this time there’s
a new issue embedded in an old issue. The old issue is how to deal with traffic 
imbalances between broadband providers and content providers who tend to send 
more traffic to broadband providers than they receive from them. The new issue 
pertains to a new approach to solving those traffic exchange problems—allowing the 
content provider to put servers in key broadband provider connection points, thereby 
minimizing the distance content has to travel between the two companies. The goal 
is to minimize transport costs and enhance the quality of the end user experience. 
And the fight now seems to be over who controls those arrangements.”).  
97. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 21; USA ISP Speed Index Results Graph 
October 2014–February 2015, NETFLIX, http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/results/ 
usa/graph (last visited Apr. 15, 2015); see also Fitzgerald & Ramachandran, supra
note 5.
98. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 21.
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that subscribers would not experience degraded service99 in light of 
the real possibility that Netflix traffic could trigger congestion.100
The migration from peer to transit, or paid-peering partner, 
represents one of many adjustments in interconnection compensation 
arrangements triggered by changes in traffic flows.101 Heretofore, 
commercially driven negotiations have managed the transition 
without resulting in many service disruptions. However, it appears 
increasingly likely that interconnection negotiations will become 
more contentious and protracted,102 particularly when retail ISPs 
demand compensation from sources of high volume, bandwidth-
intensive video content with which the ISPs do not interconnect 
directly. As the Internet becomes a more common medium for the 
delivery of video content, more compensation disputes will arise that 
have possibly greater potential for consumer inconvenience than 
carriage disputes between content providers and traditional media 
outlets, such as satellite and cable television operators. 
                                                     
99. See, e.g., Dan Rayburn, Here’s How the Comcast & Netflix Deal Is 
Structured, with Data & Numbers, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:14 
PM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-netflix-deal-structured 
-numbers.html. 
100. Netflix traffic constitutes as much as 34% of the total volume carried by 
retail ISPs during peak hours. Fitzgerald, supra note 87.
101. For background on peering, transit, and new interconnection 
arrangements, see Dennis Weller & Bill Woodcock, Internet Traffic Exchange: 
Market Developments and Policy Challenges, OECD PUBLISHING (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k918gpt130q.pdf?expires=1429 
219449&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=21E7F441C22517730F8647C0E4D4B
684; see also ANNA-MARIA KOVACS, INTERNET PEERING AND TRANSIT (2012), 
available at http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/amkinternetpeeringandtransit. 
pdf; DrPeering.net: Resources to Make Strategic Peering Decisions, supra note 45. 
102. Lyons, supra note 1, at 1034 (“By regulating the terms upon which 
content providers use their networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could 
manipulate the flow of information in society. For example, Comcast could 
conceivably block consumer access to websites like www.comcastsucks.org that 
criticize the company. Perhaps more realistically, Comcast could block or degrade 
content and applications like Netflix that compete against its other revenue-
generating services. Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up
Internet access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize in providing 
Internet access alone. Rather, the largest broadband providers are cable and 
telephone companies, which have incentives to prevent customers from using their 
broadband connections in ways that threaten their other revenue streams. For 
example, consumer groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet 
providers that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate 
against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make movies available 
over a broadband connection.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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C. Scope and Timetable for FCC Remedies Under § 706 of the 
Communications Act 
Section 706(a) of the Communications Act requires the FCC 
and state public utility commissions (PUCs) to “encourage the 
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans.”103 Section 706(b) 
requires the Commission to conduct an annual inquiry “concerning 
the availability of advanced telecommunications capability,” and, if 
it determines that access is not available on “a reasonable and timely 
fashion,” to “take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such 
capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by 
promoting competition in the telecommunications market.”104
Collectively, § 706 requires an ongoing assessment of whether the 
broadband ecosystem operates with sufficient competition and 
accessibility with the FCC obligated to remedy market failure 
resulting from insufficient infrastructure investment.  
The FCC has generated significant opposition to both its 
determination of inadequate broadband access and its decision to 
impose open Internet rules as a way to improve access and achieve 
the goals in § 706. An assessment of Internet access lacks the 
simplicity of previous market evaluations undertaken by the 
Commission and state PUCs. For example, these agencies can 
readily track progress in conventional voice telephone-service access 
by compiling statistics about the number of lines per 100 residents in 
specific geographical areas. Upon determining that inadequate 
“teledensity” exists, state and federal agencies can promote 
subscribership by subsidizing rates paid by groups identified as 
underserved or unable to afford service. Additionally, subsidies can 
flow directly to carriers to defray the costs of installing Plain Old 
Telephone Service (POTS) infrastructure into unserved or 
underserved hinterland locations.105
The implementation of § 706 has become even more 
controversial because the FCC initially had determined that this part 
of the Communications Act did not confer regulatory authority,106
                                                     
103. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
104. Id. § 1302(b). 
105. See Universal Service Support Mechanisms, FCC (Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/universal-service-support-mechanisms. 
106. “[W]e conclude that, in light of the statutory language, the framework 
of the 1996 Act, its legislative history, and Congress’ policy objectives, the most 
logical statutory interpretation is that section 706 does not constitute an independent 
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and even if it had, the Commission initially determined that adequate 
broadband access existed.107 The FCC subsequently reversed itself on 
both grounds. Now in its 2014 Open Internet Order, the FCC has 
invoked § 706 as requiring it to undertake affirmative efforts to 
promote Internet access, including rules requiring transparency and 
disclosure of specialized service arrangements, as well as a 
prohibition on unreasonable discrimination and blocking lawful 
content. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the FCC 
could reasonably reinterpret § 706 as providing statutory authority 
for some degree of private carrier oversight: “Does the 
Commission’s current understanding of section 706(a) as a grant of 
regulatory authority represent a reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute? We believe it does.”108
Having determined that it has a foundation for regulatory 
authority, the FCC has identified inadequacy in broadband access 
and has restarted the process for determining what strategies to 
pursue that will create incentives for more investment in broadband 
                                                                                                               
grant of [regulatory] authority.” Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced 
Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,012, 24,047 (1998). The FCC subsequently 
changed its mind and unsuccessfully asserted that § 706 granted it ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate information services. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected this reading but agreed with a third interpretation that § 706 does provide 
some basis for non-common carrier oversight.  
Setting forth those “reasons” at some length, the Commission analyzed the 
statute’s text, its legislative history, and the resultant scope of the 
Commission’s authority, concluding that each of these considerations 
supports the view that section 706(a) constitutes an affirmative grant of 
regulatory authority. In these circumstances, and contrary to Verizon’s
contentions, we have no basis for saying that the Commission “casually 
ignored prior policies and interpretations or otherwise failed to provide a 
reasoned explanation” for its changed interpretation.  
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
107. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640 (“Until shortly before the Commission issued 
the Open Internet Order, it had never considered whether the provision vested it 
with any regulatory authority. The Commission had no need to do so because prior 
to that time it had made no determination that advanced telecommunications 
technologies, including broadband Internet access, were not ‘being deployed to all 
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion,’ the prerequisite for any purported 
invocation of authority to ‘take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such 
capability’ under section 706(b). In July 2010, however, the Commission concluded 
that ‘broadband deployment to all Americans is not reasonable and timely.’ This 
conclusion, the Commission recognized, represented a deviation from its five prior 
assessments.” (citations omitted)).  
108. Id. at 637. 
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infrastructure particularly in locales where Internet access lags.109
Assessing the adequacy of broadband access, even using broadband-
market penetration statistics, is anything but straightforward and
uncontroversial. Stakeholders disagree on what benchmarks would 
constitute success and more broadly whether evaluative criteria 
should change over time. For example, the FCC’s National 
Broadband Plan has articulated a goal for 100 million households to 
have access to actual (not advertised) speeds of 100 megabits per 
second (mbps) by the year 2020 with all households having at least 
4 mbps downstream and 1 mbps upstream.110 Would achieving that 
goal on or before 2020 trigger the dismantling of any and all supply-
side and demand-side promotions and subsidies? More 
fundamentally, should § 706 success be assessed using national 
market penetration statistics, or should more narrow targets be used?  
Assessing the adequacy of broadband access arguably requires 
more than the simple compilation of statistics on broadband-line 
subscribership and available bit-transmission speeds. Consumers’
definition of what constitutes basic and adequate broadband service 
is constantly changing in light of their ever-increasing expectations 
and service demands. In many households, multiple users may 
attempt to download full-motion video content at the same time 
thereby increasing the overall demand for content bit-transmission 
speed that ISPs must now satisfy. While the FCC has vastly
                                                     
109. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,968 (2010) 
(“Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along with state 
commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment of ‘advanced 
telecommunications capability.’ ‘[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,’ as 
defined in the statute, includes broadband Internet access. Under Section 706(a), the 
Commission must encourage the deployment of such capability by ‘utilizing, in a 
manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,’ various 
tools including ‘measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications 
market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment.’ For the reasons stated in Parts II.A, II.D and III.B, above, our open 
Internet rules will have precisely that effect.” (footnotes omitted)), aff’d in part,
vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623, on remand
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (Jul. 1, 2014). 
110. Chapter 2: Goals for a High Performance America, NAT’L BROADBAND 
PLAN, http://www.broadband.gov/plan/2-goals-for-a-high-performance-america/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015). Additionally, “[e]very American community should 
have affordable access to at least 1 gigabit per second broadband service to anchor 
institutions such as schools, hospitals and government buildings.” Id. The Plan 
proposes an interim goal of having 100 million U.S. homes with affordable access to 
actual download speeds of 50 mbps and actual upload speeds of 20 mbps. Executive 
Summary, NAT’L BROADBAND PLAN, http://www.broadband.gov/plan/executive-
summary/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
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improved its reports on available bit-transmission speeds, it still 
largely ignores qualitative factors that arguably should constitute an 
integral part of the § 706 evaluation process. For example, the 
Commission gladly notes the availability of terrestrial and satellite 
wireless options without considering the impact of data caps, initial 
equipment costs, cost per megabyte, etc. However, most current 
subscribers of wireless broadband services have caps on their 
monthly data usage rarely exceeding a few gigabytes.111 In contrast, 
wireline broadband carrier options either have no cap at all or 
reference a 250-gigabyte cap without enforcing it.112 Wireless 
subscribers exceeding their data cap face significant surcharges. 
If the FCC were to undertake an “apples to apples”
measurement of downloading costs for currently offered wireless 
versus wireline broadband service, it would identify a substantial 
difference in per-megabyte costs. Such a normalized comparison also 
would have to factor higher initial equipment costs for wireless 
services. Most smartphones now exceed the cost of desktop 
computers. Satellite broadband subscribers typically have to pay 
several hundred dollars for signal transmission, reception, and 
processing.113 Federal and state regulatory agencies do not typically 
undertake a calculation of actual out-of-pocket costs incurred by 
subscribers. Such a calculation would identify substantial cost 
differentials in services that regulatory agencies all too often 
consider functional equivalents and direct competitors.  
Stakeholders also disagree on whether the FCC would engage 
in “mission creep” if it were to change benchmarks for determining 
the adequacy of national broadband penetration,114 or if it established 
new goals for specific locales, such as rural areas and other locales 
                                                     
111. See, e.g., The MORE Everything Plan, VERIZON WIRELESS, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/wcms/consumer/shop/shop-data-plans/more-
everything.html#configurator (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
112. See, e.g., High-Speed Internet Service with XFINITY® Internet from 
Comcast, supra note 80. 
113. See, e.g., Deals and Pricing, supra note 81. 
114. The FCC has proposed to increase the baseline level of broadband 
service that satisfies the definition of advanced telecommunications capability. 
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to 
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 30 FCC Rcd. 
1375, ¶ 3, at 1377 (2015). The Commission now proposes a threshold of actual 
download speed of twenty-five megabits per second and actual upload speed of three 
megabits per second. Id.
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where more residents have incomes at or below the poverty line than 
the national average. State and federal regulators may deem it 
appropriate to raise the bar on what constitutes success as new 
applications become available, particularly ones that require ever 
more bandwidth and bit-transmission speed, such as IPTV. 
Consumers have less patience for “appointment television” that 
rations access and specifies the time, medium, and screen. Many now 
expect “on demand” access to any and all video content from up to 
four screens: the television set, computer monitor, smartphone, and 
tablet. In the not-too-distant future, they will expect broadband 
carriers to provide a conduit sufficiently robust to carry high-
definition television as well as new “ultra” high-definition content 
that doubles both the columns and lines of picture resolution.115
D. New Disruptors  
The evolving Internet ecosystem also encourages new 
strategies for linking consumers with content outside of traditional 
peering and transit arrangements. Many new consumers’ self-help 
strategies have evolved, some of which violate the intellectual 
property rights of content creators and distributors. Additionally, 
new ventures have devised strategies for delivering content via the 
Internet in ways that attempt to evade licensing and other forms of 
payment. While many contact, access, and delivery tactics use 
questionable or illegal tactics, collectively they have the potential to 
disrupt, but not necessarily destroy, existing models for content 
delivery.  
Previous disruptors support this premise. For example, cable 
television initially caused great anxiety among both broadcasters and 
movie theater operators based on the assumption that this new 
technology would cause financial havoc by fragmenting audiences 
and siphoning off revenues.116 Rather than trigger a major migration 
                                                     
115. FCC, FCC CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER: MORE COMPETITION NEEDED IN 
HIGH-SPEED BROADBAND MARKETPLACE 1 (2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329160A1.pdf (“By most calculations, a single HD 
movie requires 5 Mbps and super HD requires 7 Mbps of download speed. The 
average U.S. Internet-connected homes have six connected devices—televisions, 
desktops, laptops, tablets, smartphones, etc. When those devices are in use at the 
same time, it’s not difficult to strain the capacity of a 25 Mbps connection, and 
completely overwhelm a 4 Mbps connection.”).  
116. See, e.g., PATRICK R. PARSONS, BLUE SKIES: A HISTORY OF CABLE 
TELEVISION 355, 489, 622 (2008) (providing a comprehensive history of cable 
television development).
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among existing consumers, this new technology expanded the market 
for audio-visual content.117 Additionally, broadcasters considered 
cable television-carriage piracy, based on the ability to retransmit 
signals without having to compensate broadcasters for the privilege. 
Eventually, legislation118 preempted a developing body of case law 
supporting free carriage,119 eventually leading to the mutually 
beneficial relationship between a larger set of MVPDs and 
broadcasters. Rather than siphon audiences and revenues, MVPDs 
now compensate most broadcasters while also situating themselves 
as well-compensated intermediaries between broadcasters and 
consumers. Approximately 90% of all households with television 
sets receive video content via an MVPD instead of directly off air.120
1. Aereo and Questions About Cloud-Based Content Access  
Comcast’s demand for increased compensation from Netflix 
and its CDNs raises broader questions about how various 
stakeholders will fare in future commercial negotiations for access to 
content and for carriage. The possibility exists that content creators 
and distributors will attempt to eliminate intermediaries who receive 
compensation for functions that can be replaced or eliminated. 
MVPDs in particular appear at risk for such disintermediation 
because the Internet can match or exceed their content-delivery 
performance and replicate their ability to aggregate, bill, and collect 
payment from a sizeable audience.121
                                                     
117. See id. at 578, 586. 
118. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 
2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
119. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 
394, 405 (1974) (holding that there was no copyright infringement for 
retransmission of distant broadcast television signals); Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1968) (holding that a community 
antenna television system retransmission of unaltered broadcast signal did not 
constitute a public performance and copyright infringement).
120. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 28 FCC Rcd. 10,496, 10,500 (2013) (Fifteenth 
Report) (“Since the last report, the number of households relying exclusively on 
over-the-air broadcast service has remained steady at approximately 11.1 million 
households, although the percentage of all households they represent increased 
slightly from 9.6 percent in 2011 to 9.7 percent in 2012.”).
121. For example, Dish Network recently announced a satellite or Internet 
delivery service comprised of twelve cable networks for $20 a month, a rate well 
below the average monthly cable or DBS rate. Emily Steel, Dish Network Unveils 
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The tactics and accomplishments of illegal and legally suspect 
disintermediation options can provide insight of what lawful tactics 
may soon appear. For example, downloading video files using peer-
to-peer software, such as that provided by BitTorent, initially 
provided a faster way to share mostly pirated content.122 Over time, 
carriers and content providers alike have considered this file-sharing 
technique as an efficient and speedy content delivery option.123
The unsuccessful legal campaign of Aereo may follow a 
similar track from unlawful piracy to legitimacy, at least for the 
underlying technology used. Aereo devised a technical and legal 
strategy aiming to use the Internet to deliver broadcast television 
signals without compensating copyright holders.124 Relying on 
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,125 the company devised a 
strategy that attempted to emphasize end-user control over signal 
reception and delivery, instead of the retransmission of copyrighted 
content without authorization.  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a cable 
television operator, Cablevision, did not infringe on the copyrights of 
networks carried by the company when it made an individual copy of 
copyrighted video content on behalf of a specific subscriber.126
                                                                                                               
Sling TV, a Streaming Service to Rival Cable (and It Has ESPN), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
6, 2015, at B3. 
122. Amy Rosen, The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming: An Analysis of 
Extortive Pornographic “Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventative Approaches, ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. Mar. 2014, at 1, 21-22 (“The P2P system works by using the Internet 
to connect computer systems to each other, with files directly shared between 
systems on the network without the need of a central server. . . . The BitTorrent 
system is a type of P2P network, but reduces the bandwidth required to transfer files. 
The BitTorrent system finds many computers that each send pieces of a broken file 
to the downloading computer. After receiving the smaller pieces of the file from 
multiple computers, the BitTorrent program puts the file pieces back together to 
recreate the original file. The BitTorrent system is more efficient than the regular 
P2P system because it relies on multiple computers for smaller pieces, instead of one 
computer for an entire file.” (footnotes omitted)); see Peter K. Yu, P2P and the 
Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 695-96, 742 (2005) (providing 
background and a historical context that demonstrates technological progress). 
123. Betsy Isaacson, BitTorrent Wants You to Know It’s a Legitimate 
Business, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2014, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/17/bitorrent-piracy_n_4781654.html. 
124. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 
(2014). 
125. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
126. Id. at 131, 135, 139 (“There are only two instances of volitional conduct 
in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system 
that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system 
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Responding to commands from subscribers to record content did not 
constitute the unauthorized transmission of such content—an integral 
part of the proof needed to evidence a public performance in turn 
direct liability for copyright infringement.  
The Cablevision remote-storage function divided into two 
parts.127 First, Cablevision routinely, but temporarily, buffered video 
content so that it could make copies as directed by subscribers. The 
court deemed the buffering function transitory and not sufficiently 
fixed to constitute a copy.128 Cablevision also converted the buffered 
content into a fixed copy as directed by individual subscribers. The 
court held that such “playback” copies did constitute unauthorized 
copies but determined that the copying party was not Cablevision but 
in fact were individual subscribers who directed Cablevision 
equipment to make the copies.129 Because the plaintiffs in the case 
did not seek to prove secondarily liability on the part of Cablevision 
for facilitating and inducing the copies, the company incurred no 
liability for its remote DVR service.130
The court also determined that cable television subscribers 
directing the company to make copies also did not directly infringe 
                                                                                                               
to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and 
we know of no case holding otherwise—that the operator of the VCR, the person 
who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary 
element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from 
the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS–DVR customer is 
sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer 
on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s
command.”).  
127. Id. at 124 (“Under the new RS–DVR, this single stream of data is split 
into two streams. The first is routed immediately to customers as before. The second 
stream flows into a device called the Broadband Media Router (‘BMR’), which 
buffers the data stream, reformats it, and sends it to the ‘Arroyo Server,’ which 
consists, in relevant part, of two data buffers and a number of high-capacity hard 
disks. The entire stream of data moves to the first buffer (the ‘primary ingest 
buffer’), at which point the server automatically inquires as to whether any 
customers want to record any of that programming. If a customer has requested a 
particular program, the data for that program move from the primary buffer into a 
secondary buffer, and then onto a portion of one of the hard disks allocated to that 
customer.” (citation omitted) (citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))).  
128. Id. at 127-30. 
129. Id. at 131-33. 
130. Id. at 137 (“[B]ecause the RS–DVR system, as designed, only makes 
transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe 
that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS–DVR transmission is the 
single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission.”).  
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the copyright of the content creators. Whether by using a DVR at 
home or a remote DVR on the premises of the cable company, the 
subscriber secures a copy of content he or she already has a right to 
consume.131
The Supreme Court eventually decided that Cartoon Network
precedent should not apply to Aereo because the company operated 
much like a cable television service whose retransmission of 
copyrighted material constitutes a public performance requiring 
broadcaster consent.132 Aereo had attempted to avoid this 
classification by claiming that it merely installed a small antenna for 
each and every subscriber so that they individually could direct the 
company to deliver via the Internet the received broadcast signal and 
also to make copies for later delivery.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer distilled the case into 
two questions: “First, in operating in the manner described above, 
does Aereo ‘perform’ at all? And second, if so, does Aereo do so 
‘publicly?’”133 The majority decision answers both questions in the 
affirmative. Aereo performs because its broadcast signal 
retransmission and copying function parallels the functions of a cable 
television venture and satisfies the definition of performance enacted 
by Congress in the 1976 amendment of the Copyright Act.134
Referring to the legislative history of the 1976 amendment, 
Justice Breyer reports that Congress consciously sought to reverse 
two Supreme Court decisions that considered the cable television 
retransmission function not a public performance. In Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., the Court held that a 
community antenna television (CATV) system did not publicly 
perform copyrighted broadcast television content when it simply 
distributed it to subscribers without alteration in much the same way 
that individuals could have done using their own antennas.135 In 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the 
Court considered the copyright liability of a CATV provider that 
delivered broadcast television programming from distant sources that 
                                                     
131. Id. at 139 (“Because each RS–DVR playback transmission is made to a 
single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we 
conclude that such transmissions are not performances ‘to the public,’ and therefore 
do not infringe any exclusive right of public performance.”).  
132. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504-05, 2507-10 (2014). 
133. Id. at 2504.  
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
135. 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1968). 
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subscribers could not receive if they had erected a rooftop antenna.136
The Court had reasoned that cable operators functioned like a private 
viewer and not a broadcaster or performer.137 Justice Breyer reasoned 
that because Congress expressly created language deeming content 
transmission a public performance, the Court had to treat Aereo’s
delivery service as the functional equivalent of a transmission and 
public performance, notwithstanding the fact that subscribers initiate 
the transmission and copying functions performed by the company: 
“This history makes clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment 
provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, ‘perform[s]’ (or 
‘transmit[s]’). Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of 
the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”138
The majority decision rejects as insignificant a difference in the 
manner by which copyrighted content reaches subscribers.139 Cable 
retransmission occurs simultaneously and continuously without 
authorization or direction from subscribers while Aereo requires 
subscribers to initiate the service and determine whether to direct 
equipment to make copies. Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia 
considers this difference significant because the transmission and 
copying function does not occur unless and until a subscriber directs 
Aereo equipment to activate.140 Justice Scalia analogized the 
coordination between Aereo and its subscribers to that which occurs 
when a copy center issues an equipment activation and library card 
                                                     
136. 415 U.S. 394, 399-401 (1974). 
137. “Although the Court recognized that a viewer might not be able to 
afford amplifying equipment that would provide access to those distant signals, it 
nonetheless found that the CATV provider was more like a viewer than a 
broadcaster.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505 (citing Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408-09). 
138. Id. at 2506 (alterations in original); see also id. at 2506-07 (“Aereo’s 
equipment may serve a ‘viewer function’; it may enhance the viewer’s ability to 
receive a broadcaster’s programs. It may even emulate equipment a viewer could 
use at home. But the same was true of the equipment that was before the Court, and 
ultimately before Congress, in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.”).  
139. “Given Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted 
by the 1976 amendments, this sole technological difference between Aereo and 
traditional cable companies does not make a critical difference here.” Id. at 2507.  
140. Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Rather, it assigns each subscriber an 
antenna that—like a library card—can be used to obtain whatever broadcasts are 
freely available. Some of those broadcasts are copyrighted; others are in the public 
domain. The key point is that subscribers call all the shots: Aereo’s automated 
system does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a subscriber selects the 
program and tells Aereo to relay it.”).  
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for customers who make copies on their own volition, using the copy 
center’s equipment.141
On the issue of whether Aereo publicly performs copyrighted 
material, the majority determined that the company did publicly 
perform despite having installed a dedicated antenna for the 
exclusive use of one subscriber.142 Even if the Court were to accept 
the view that Aereo initiated a new performance in its reception and 
retransmission function, the majority still considered the 
performance public.143 Justice Breyer reasoned that Congress 
intended on protecting broadcasters’ copyrights even if technological 
innovations involved subscriber interaction with equipment and 
content streams did not flow instantaneously and constantly to 
subscribers:  
[W]hy should any of these technological differences matter? They concern 
the behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television 
programming to its viewers’ screens. They do not render Aereo’s
commercial objective any different from that of cable companies. Nor do 
they significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers. 
Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care much 
whether images and sounds are delivered to his screen via a large 
multisubscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they 
arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether they are 
transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made? And why, if Aereo is 
right, could not modern CATV systems simply continue the same 
commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free of copyright 
restrictions, provided they substitute such new technologies for old? 
                                                     
141. Id. at 2513 (“A comparison between copy shops and video-on-demand 
services illustrates the point. A copy shop rents out photocopiers on a per-use basis. 
One customer might copy his 10-year-old’s drawings—a perfectly lawful thing to 
do—while another might duplicate a famous artist’s copyrighted photographs—a
use clearly prohibited by § 106(1). Either way, the customer chooses the content and 
activates the copying function; the photocopier does nothing except in response to 
the customer’s commands. Because the shop plays no role in selecting the content, it 
cannot be held directly liable when a customer makes an infringing copy.”). “Aereo 
does not ‘perform’ for the sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of 
content. And because Aereo does not perform, it cannot be held directly liable for 
infringing the Networks’ public-performance right.” Id. at 2514. 
142. Id. at 2507 (majority opinion). 
143. Id. at 2508 (“When an Aereo subscriber selects a program to watch, 
Aereo streams the program over the Internet to that subscriber. Aereo thereby 
‘communicate[s]’ to the subscriber, by means of a ‘device or process,’ the work’s
images and sounds. And those images and sounds are contemporaneously visible 
and audible on the subscriber’s computer (or other Internet-connected device). So 
under our assumed definition, Aereo transmits a performance whenever its 
subscribers watch a program.” (citation omitted)).  
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Congress would as much have intended to protect a copyright holder from 
the unlicensed activities of Aereo as from those of cable companies.144
The majority opinion interprets the Transmit Clause contained 
in the 1976 Copyright Act amendments145 as applicable regardless of 
whether there are multiple, geographically diverse, discrete, time-
delayed, or subscriber-initiated transmissions from Aereo 
equipment.146 While sensitive to the possibility that its decision at 
least temporarily blocks technological and entrepreneurial 
innovations, the Court suggests that Congress can and will act, just 
as it did in response to the onset of cable television.  
The Court also recognized that fair use may allow some 
innovations to flourish and also seeks to exempt the decision from 
related questions about Internet-based, “cloud” storage of content.147
However, having rejected Aereo’s legal interpretation and having 
nullified the Cartoon Network case, the Court raises the question 
about what new ventures can do to facilitate consumer storage, 
sharing, and transmission of video content. While not directly 
addressing network neutrality, the Aereo case raises questions about 
whether and how IPTV and OTT applications can replace traditional 
content-distribution technologies. The Aereo case may have an 
adverse impact on venture capitalists’ enthusiasm for funding new 
ventures with business plans that rely on nondiscriminatory access to 
broadband networks and the Internet cloud for storage and delivery 
of content.  
                                                     
144. Id. at 2508-09. 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
146. “Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, we conclude 
that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images 
and sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them regardless of the 
number of discrete communications it makes.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. “So 
whether Aereo transmits from the same or separate copies, it performs the same 
work; it shows the same images and makes audible the same sounds. Therefore, 
when Aereo streams the same television program to multiple subscribers, it 
‘transmit[s] . . . a performance’ to all of them.” Id.
147. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks 
that make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these 
networks and the content available via these networks: “The increasing functionality 
of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift is being led 
by the growth of ‘cloud computing’—the ability to run applications and store data 
on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s
desktop computer.” Robison, supra note 10, at 1199 (footnote omitted); see also
Jake Vandelist, Note, Status Update: Adapting the Stored Communications Act to a 
Modern World, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1536, 1545-46 (2014). 
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2. Other Types of Disintermediation 
Another form of disintermediation combines broadband 
delivery of “must see” content packaged by incumbents themselves 
and delivered to individual consumers without the assistance of 
intermediaries, such as MVPDs. Major sources of quite desirable 
content, including ESPN, Major League Baseball, the National 
Football League Network, and HBO have experimented with 
premium-content delivery options directly via the Internet.148
Major content providers have acted with caution in assessing 
options for disintermediating cable and satellite television operators. 
MVPDs continue to offer a large bundle of channels in a 
programming tier, without an option for subscribers to select 
networks on an a la carte basis. Heretofore, content creators and 
packagers have determined that the cost of having to share revenues 
with MVPDs is less than the upside gain in offering their content 
directly to consumers. By having their content bundled in a basic or 
enhanced-basic tier to which most consumers subscribe, content 
producers receive a smaller per-subscriber payment but higher total 
revenues in light of the number of subscribers paying for access to 
the programming tier. For example, ESPN receives approximately 
$5.54 per subscriber per month from MVPDs149 who include this 
network in a programming tier paid for by just about every 
                                                     
148. Brian Moylan, HBO Go Without Needing Cable? Welcome to the 
Future of Television, GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2013, 8:00 AM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/media/2014/sep/13/hbo-go-without-needing-cable-welcome-
to-the-future-of-television (“The talk these days in cable television is all about ‘cord 
cutters’, those people who are willing to get their TV fix by watching shows on a 
channel’s website, downloading them from iTunes, or even waiting for them to 
show up on streaming services like Netflix and Hulu and then binging every episode 
at once. HBO Go is the cord cutter’s holy grail. It allows HBO subscribers access to 
all of HBO’s movies and original programs, on demand. Now it looks like HBO Go 
might be available to those without cable. Welcome to the future.”); see also Mark 
Rogowsky, Cut the Cord? HBO Considers Selling Direct to Better Combat Netflix,
FORBES (Sept. 11, 2014, 5:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
markrogowsky/2014/09/11/capocalypse-now-hbo-edges-closer-to-blowing-up-the-
cable-industry-as-we-know-it/; Mark Rogowsky, Is It Time for HBO to Sell Directly 
to Consumers?, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/markrogowsky/2013/10/22/with-netflix-rolling-is-it-time-for-hbo-to-go-direct/. 
149. The media research firm SNL Kagen reports that ESPN charges 
MVPDs approximately $5.54 per month per subscriber, a rate four times the 
monthly fee for the next most expensive national network. Richard Sandomir, James 
Andrew Miller & Steve Eder, To Protect Its Empire, ESPN Stays on Offense, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, at A1. 
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subscriber. Even if ESPN could double or triple the per-subscriber 
charge if it were to make its content available on an a la carte basis 
via an MVPD network, or even independently via the Internet, the 
company’s total gross revenues apparently would fall.  
MVPD bundling of many channels forces subscribers to pay 
for content they do not desire. Faced with rising content costs, 
MVPDs offering large bundles of content have to increase monthly 
subscription rates, typically well in excess of general measures of 
inflation.150 A small but growing number of subscribers have “cut the 
cord” and abandoned their MVPD subscription based on such rising 
costs and the assumption that they can access enough “must see”
content from IPTV and other on-demand sources such as Netflix and 
Hulu.151 Should this customer churn grow, MVPDs might have to 
offer lower cost a la carte content-selection options even though this 
also might improve the financial payoff from their disintermediation 
by major content creators. 
So far, MVPDs and content creators have closed ranks and 
attempted to enhance the value proposition of the status quo. Many 
MVPD now offer subscribers opportunities to access prime content 
on demand using IPTV and OTT applications that deliver the content 
to multiple screens, including mobile smartphone handsets and 
tablets. Going forward, it appears that consumers will have more 
options for accessing premium content for pay but without 
compulsory additional subscription payments to an MVPD. 
                                                     
150. Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & 
Competition Act of 1992, 29 FCC Rcd. 14,895, 14,895 (2014) (“The average 
monthly price of expanded basic service (the combined price of basic service and 
the most subscribed cable programming service tier excluding taxes, fees and 
equipment charges) for all communities surveyed increased by 3.1 percent over the 
12 months ending January 1, 2014, to $66.61, compared to an annual increase of 1.6 
percent in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The price of expanded basic service has 
increased at a compound average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent during the period 
1995-2014. The CPI increased at a compound average annual growth rate of 2.4 
percent over the same period.”).
151. Edmund Lee, TV Subscriptions Fall for First Time as Viewers Cut the 
Cord, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 19, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-19/u-s-pay-tv-subscriptions-fall-for-first-time-as-
streaming-gains.html (“The number of Americans who pay for TV through cable, 
satellite or fiber services fell by more than a quarter of a million in 2013, the first 
full-year decline, according to research firm SNL Kagan. If the slide continues in the 
coming years, that means 2012 was the industry’s high point.”).  
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III. IS THERE A WAY FORWARD? 
The network neutrality debate continues to present the FCC 
and other National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) with seemingly 
unresolvable challenges. They have to address macro-level issues 
such as whether and how to remedy limitations on marketplace self-
regulation even as technological innovations and other changed 
circumstances require a modification of current policies. Regulatory 
agencies appear neither able to respond to technological and 
marketplace changes in a timely manner nor can legislatures craft 
laws that can work effectively well past the year of enactment. 
The Internet ecosystem has proven quite vibrant and able to 
work well with limited but essential government oversight. The key 
lies in how well the FCC and other NRAs can calibrate their 
oversight and marketplace intervention to the minimal degree 
necessary. This process requires great finesse and the willingness to 
abandon absolute and unmovable positions based on political and 
economic doctrines.  
As a starting point for considering the way forward, perhaps it 
makes sense to look back to a time when all five FCC 
Commissioners agreed on a baseline Internet policy. In 2005, the 
FCC released a short Policy Statement identifying four principle 
values the Commission should embrace.152 The Commission reached 
bipartisan agreement:  
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open 
and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
access the lawful Internet content of their choice. 
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open 
and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of 
law enforcement. 
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open 
and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network. 
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open 
and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
competition among network providers, application and service providers, 
and content providers.153
                                                     
152. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (2005). 
153. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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In these hyper partisan and contentious times, one can have great 
skepticism whether a unanimous FCC could agree on these 
principles, even though they do not operate as binding rules and have 
no enforceability. Yet, these principles remain as essential now as 
they did in 2005. Nothing has so changed in terms of technological 
and marketplace development to reduce the need for a limited FCC 
role to prevent subversion of these principles. 
